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SENTENCED TO SURVEILLANCE:                
FOURTH AMENDMENT LIMITS ON ELECTRONIC 
MONITORING* 
KATE WEISBURD** 
As courts and legislatures increasingly recognize that “digital is different” and 
attempt to limit government surveillance of private data, one group is 
conspicuously excluded from this new privacy-protective discourse: the five 
million people in the United States on probation, parole, or other forms of 
community supervision. This Article is the first to explore how warrantless 
electronic surveillance is dramatically transforming community supervision and, 
as a result, amplifying a growing privacy-protection disparity: those in the 
criminal legal system are increasingly losing privacy protections even while those 
not in the system are increasingly gaining privacy protections. The quickly 
expanding use of GPS-equipped ankle monitors, as well as other forms of 
electronic searches, reflects unprecedented government surveillance that has yet to 
be regulated, scrutinized, or limited in any meaningful way. 
This Article explores this phenomenon in its own right but also contends that the 
expanding disparity in privacy protections is explained by two underappreciated 
but significant shifts in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. First, on the theory 
that defendants “choose” surveillance in exchange for avoiding incarceration, 
courts increasingly invoke consent to justify otherwise unconstitutional 
surveillance of people on community supervision. While the debate over criminal 
justice bargaining is not new, the expanded reliance on consent in this context 
reveals blind spots in the existing debate. Second, courts also increasingly accept 
government arguments in favor of otherwise unconstitutional electronic 
monitoring under a general “reasonableness” standard, as opposed to the 
traditional “special needs” doctrine. This insidious shift toward “reasonableness” 
threatens to jeopardize the precise interests the Fourth Amendment was designed 
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to protect. But even under a reasonableness standard, electronic surveillance of 
people on community supervision should be more circumscribed. Ultimately, this 
Article reveals how the significance of these two shifts extends beyond electronic 
surveillance and represents a new frontier of sanctioning warrantless searches 
without any level of suspicion or exception to the warrant requirement. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The key government witness against Zackary Jackson was not a person but 
the GPS-equipped monitor strapped to his ankle.1 It was the GPS monitor, and 
the GPS monitor alone, that placed Mr. Jackson at the scene of a robbery in 
Washington, D.C., in 2015. And it was the GPS monitor that led the police to 
Mr. Jackson’s location where he was arrested. Mr. Jackson’s arrest for robbery, 
and his ultimate conviction, was the culmination of a coordinated effort between 
the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department and the D.C. Court Services and 
Offender Supervision Agency. At the time of the 2015 robbery Mr. Jackson was 
on probation for a prior offense. A few weeks prior to the robbery, his probation 
officer was contacted by a D.C. police detective asking that Mr. Jackson be 
placed on a GPS monitor so that the police could track him and see if he 
committed any crimes.2 Mr. Jackson’s probation officer then reviewed his file, 
concluded that he was in violation of some technical rules, including his failure 
to find employment and participate in programming, and required that Mr. 
Jackson wear a GPS ankle monitor.3 As a condition of wearing the monitor, Mr. 
Jackson signed a contract agreeing to twenty-two GPS-specific rules, including 
that he obtain pre-approval to change his daily schedule, that he charge his 
device twice a day, that he not fall asleep while the device charges, and other 
rules.4 There was no term about Mr. Jackson’s location data being shared with 
the police. Although the trial court found that the government’s use of the GPS 
data infringed on Mr. Jackson’s reasonable expectation of privacy, the D.C. 
Court of Appeals disagreed, reasoning that the “Fourth Amendment permits 
probation supervision to intrude significantly on probationers’ privacy.”5 
Mr. Jackson’s case is no anomaly; in the past few years, surveillance 
technology has dramatically transformed community supervision.6 The use of 
 
 1. United States v. Jackson, 214 A.3d 464, 469–70 (D.C. 2019).  
 2. Id. at 468.  
 3. Id. at 468–69. 
 4. Id. at 469. 
 5. Id. at 475. 
 6. See Ava Kofman, Digital Jail: How Electronic Monitoring Drives Defendants into Debt, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG. (July 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/03/magazine/digital-jail-
surveillance.html [https://perma.cc/9A4G-XF5W (dark archive)]. Throughout this Article, the author 
uses the term “community supervision” to describe the different types of state and federal probation, 
parole, and supervised release. 
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electronic monitoring has more than doubled in the past decade,7 with people 
now routinely placed on ankle monitors that they must pay for, that track their 
every move 24–7, and that are accompanied by dozens of rules that govern all 
aspects of daily life.8 Those who have been on a monitor describe it as a “digital 
shackle,”9 a “satellite prison,”10 and that it made them “feel like an animal.”11 
Likewise, many people on community supervision—both adults and children—
are subject to continuous suspicionless searches of their personal electronic 
devices and data.12 To an unprecedented degree, the state now has the power 
to monitor the political speech, religious affiliations, health information, and 
romantic or personal communications of thousands of young people and adults 
on community supervision.13 
Curiously, this level of increasingly invasive and largely unregulated 
electronic surveillance of those on community supervision stands in stark 
contrast to recent statutory efforts and constitutional court decisions 
significantly limiting government surveillance of private citizens who are not in 
the criminal legal system. Critics on both ends of the political spectrum oppose 
large-scale government collection of DNA14 and have lamented the extent to 
which law enforcement agencies analyze social media data.15 At the same time, 
 
 7. See THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS., USE OF ELECTRONIC OFFENDER-TRACKING DEVICES 
EXPANDS SHARPLY 1 (Sept. 2016), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2016/10/
use_of_electronic_offender_tracking_devices_expands_sharply.pdf [https://perma.cc/7F3Q-QZ54]. 
 8. Kate Weisburd, Monitoring Youth: The Collision of Rights and Rehabilitation, 101 IOWA L. REV. 
297, 304 (2015) (describing typical electronic monitoring requirements for a sixteen-year-old, including 
having any outings other than those school approved at least forty-eight hours in advance). 
 9. Olivia Solon, ‘Digital Shackles’: The Unexcepted Cruelty of Ankle Monitors, GUARDIAN (Aug. 28, 
2018), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/aug/28/digital-shackles-the-unexpected-
cruelty-of-ankle-monitors [https://perma.cc/LPK5-MQ3X]. 
 10. James Kilgore, Monica Cosby-“Out Here We Have So Much More To Lose”, YOUTUBE (Mar. 
24, 2018), www.youtube.com/watch?v=gON7U5Szdmc [https://perma.cc/V8KD-MUE4]. 
 11. Myaisha Hayes, Opinion, #NoMoreShackles: Why Electronic Monitoring Devices Are Another 
Form of Prison, COLORLINES (Dec. 5, 2018, 2:34 PM), https://www.colorlines.com/articles/
nomoreshackles-why-electronic-monitoring-devices-are-another-form-prison-op-ed [https://perma.cc/
H4RT-3CQP]. 
 12. See, e.g., United States v. Bare, 806 F.3d 1011, 1013–14 (9th Cir. 2015) (upholding a condition 
of supervised release permitting search of defendant’s personal computers); United States v. Ristine, 
335 F.3d 692, 695–97 (8th Cir. 2003) (same); In re Ricardo P., 446 P.3d 747, 749–50 (Cal. 2019) 
(striking down an electronic search condition for a young person on probation); State v. Phillips, 266 
So. 3d 873, 874 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019) (reversing suppression order regarding evidence obtained 
during a warrantless cellphone search of parolee). 
 13. See infra Section I.A.1.  
 14. See, e.g., Federal DNA Collection, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., 
https://www.eff.org/foia/federal-dna-collection [https://perma.cc/CJ8W-238P]; P.J. Klosinski, Bill of 
Rights Privacy vs. Legislated DNA Collection, LIBERTARIAN PARTY IND. (Dec. 21, 2016), 
http://lpin.org/bill-of-rights-privacy-vs-legislated-dna-collection/ [https://perma.cc/5QAX-29FR] 
(arguing against arrestee DNA database expansion). 
 15. See, e.g., Free Speech and Toleration, CHARLES KOCH INST., 
https://www.charleskochinstitute.org/issue-areas/free-speech-and-toleration [https://perma.cc/4VZF-
CV3U]; Hugh Handeyside, We’re Demanding the Government Come Clean on Surveillance of Social Media, 
98 N.C. L. REV. 717 (2020) 
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reports of private companies collecting and selling cell phone location data,16 as 
well as private photos on social media websites,17 have set off bipartisan alarms 
and a call for greater regulation.18 Likewise, efforts are underway at the local, 
state, and federal levels to regulate—and sometimes ban—the use of facial 
recognition technology.19 And the oft-divided Supreme Court has taken 
unanimous stands against warrantless electronic surveillance and cell phone 
searches of arrestees, even when officers have probable cause to arrest the 
suspect.20 The Court has likewise recognized that the concept of a “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” for Fourth Amendment purposes must reflect the 
“seismic shifts in digital technology”21 that now allow for “near perfect 
surveillance”22 of digital records that “hold for many Americans the ‘privacies 
of life.’”23 These efforts reflect a bipartisan consensus that, when it comes to 
government surveillance of private citizens, “digital is different.”24 
 
ACLU (May 24, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/internet-privacy/were-
demanding-government-come-clean-surveillance-social [https://perma.cc/6WTZ-SZWE]. 
 16. Stuart A. Thompson & Charlie Warzel, How To Track Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/12/20/opinion/location-data-national-security.html 
[https://perma.cc/H7SQ-JPDM (dark archive)] (citing Democratic and Republican Senators’ concerns 
that passive location tracking via smartphones violates privacy rights).  
 17. Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy as We Know It, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-privacy-facial-
recognition.html [https://perma.cc/93J6-HWQ8 (dark archive)]. 
 18. See, e.g., Kashmir Hill, New Jersey Bars Police from Using Clearview Facial Recognition App, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/24/technology/clearview-ai-new-
jersey.html [https://perma.cc/79E8-DN2X (dark archive)]. 
 19. See, e.g., S. 1385, 191st Leg., 2019 Sess. (Mass. 2019) (calling for a moratorium on facial 
recognition and other biometric surveillance systems); S. 5528, 66th Leg., 2019 Leg. Sess. (Wash. 
2019) (restricting use of facial recognition technology by government entities); Facial Recognition 
Technology (Part 1): Its Impact on Our Civil Rights and Liberties: Hearing Before H. Comm. on Oversight & 
Reform, 116th Cong. 1–3 (2019) [hereinafter Hearing], https://docs.house.gov/meetings/GO/
GO00/20190522/109521/HHRG-116-GO00-Transcript-20190522.pdf [https://perma.cc/679K-
MGMA] (statement of Hon. Elijah Cummings, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform); Kate 
Conger, Richard Fausset & Serge F. Kovaleski, San Francisco Bans Facial Recognition Technology, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/14/us/facial-recognition-ban-san-
francisco.html [https://perma.cc/J5TW-XKPT (dark archive)]. 
 20. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (holding that third-party 
possession of an individual’s cellphone location data “does not by itself overcome the user’s claim to 
Fourth Amendment protection”); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 401 (2014) (requiring, generally, a 
warrant for cellphone searches of arrestees); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012) (holding 
that long-term GPS tracking of a suspect’s vehicle constituted a search). 
 21. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219. 
 22. Id. at 2210. 
 23. Riley, 573 U.S. at 403 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). 
 24. See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 19, at 9–11 (statement of Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Professor of 
Law, University of D.C.) (explaining that new regulation of surveillance technology is needed because 
“digital is different”); Jennifer Stisa Granick, SCOTUS & Cell Phone Searches: Digital Is Different, JUST 
SECURITY (June 25, 2014), https://www.justsecurity.org/12219/scotus-cell-phone-searches-digital 
[https://perma.cc/E3VQ-RXZX] (arguing that Riley stands for a Fourth Amendment principle of 
greater protection for electronic information). 
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And yet, for the 4.5 million people in the United States on probation, 
parole, and other forms of community-based court supervision,25 “digital is 
different” has come to mean digital is worse.26 Perversely, the surge in electronic 
surveillance mechanisms has amplified a growing privacy-protection disparity: 
those not in the criminal legal system are increasingly gaining privacy 
protections while those inside of the system, like Mr. Jackson, are increasingly 
losing privacy protections. There is a general and growing consensus that 
“[w]ithin America’s own representative democracy, citizens would surely rise 
up in outrage if the government attempted to mandate that every person above 
the age of 12 carry a tracking device that revealed their location 24 hours a 
day.”27 Yet this is the lived experience of those on probation and parole who 
wear GPS ankle monitors, and the disparity in privacy protections does not 
impact everyone equally.28 As other scholars have observed, surveillance and 
other forms of automated big data policing reflect both a history of racialized 
social control and inequity.29 
Of course, the unequal distribution of privacy rights between those in the 
criminal legal system and those not is hardly a new phenomenon.30 People on 
 
 25. See Jake Horowitz, Probation and Parole Systems Marked by High Stakes, Missed Opportunities, 
PEW (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2018/09/
probation-and-parole-systems-marked-by-high-stakes-missed-opportunities [https://perma.cc/3VMK-
X5TJ]; cf. New Analysis Shows How Parole and Probation Violations Significantly Impact States’ Prison 
Populations and Budgets, COUNCIL ST. GOV’TS JUST. CTR. (June 18, 2019), https://csgjusticecenter.org/
corrections/posts/new-analysis-shows-how-parole-and-probation-violations-significantly-impact-
states-prison-populations-and-budgets/ [https://perma.cc/F6YP-D8A5] (stating that approximately 
95,000 people are incarcerated due to technical probation or parole violations every day, at an annual 
cost of approximately $2.8 billion); Stuart A. Thompson & Charlie Warzel, Opinion, Twelve Million 
Phones, One Dataset, Zero Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2019/12/19/opinion/location-tracking-cell-phone.html [https://perma.cc/R4EG-D69V (dark archive)] 
(detailing the specific location information of millions of Americans that private corporations collect 
and hold). 
 26. See infra Section III.C.2.c. 
 27. Thompson & Warzel, supra note 25. 
 28. See Bennett Capers, Race, Policing, and Technology, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1241, 1288 (2017) 
(describing the racialized nature of “unequal private privacy”). 
 29. See SIMONE BROWNE, DARK MATTERS: ON THE SURVEILLANCE OF BLACKNESS 8 (2015) 
(“[E]nactments of surveillance reify boundaries along racial lines . . . the outcome of this is often 
discriminatory and violent treatment.”); ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA 
POLICING: SURVEILLANCE, RACE, AND THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 131–40 (2017); Ruha 
Benjamin, Introduction, in CAPTIVATING TECHNOLOGY: RACE, CARCERAL TECHNOSCIENCE, AND 
LIBERATORY IMAGINATION IN EVERYDAY LIFE 3, 3 (Ruha Benjamin ed., 2019) (describing 
automated policing as the “New Jim Code—innovation that enables social containment while appearing 
fairer than discriminatory practices of a previous era”); Elizabeth E. Joh, Automated Policing, 15 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 559, 563 (2018) (claiming that automated policing “may exacerbate social inequalities 
in ways that have to be addressed”). 
 30. See Capers, supra note 28, at 1290; Christopher Slobogin, The Poverty Exception to the Fourth 
Amendment, 55 FLA. L. REV. 391, 401–05 (2003) (arguing that poorer people and their property 
generally receive weaker Fourth Amendment protection than others); William J. Stuntz, The 
Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1265, 1267 (1999) [hereinafter Stuntz, 
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probation and parole have, admittedly, long existed in a legal “netherworld” in 
that they are neither in prison nor totally free.31 Both people on community 
supervision and in prison inevitably have certain rights curtailed as conditions 
of their sentence. Yet these conditions—from strip searches to mandatory drug 
testing—must still pass constitutional muster.32 
This Article explores and critiques this puzzling privacy disparity, offering 
both an explanatory account for its insidious rise and a reformist path forward. 
As explained below, this growing disparity does not reflect a public consensus 
that those on community supervision should have even less privacy than in the 
past. Rather, the disparity stems from two underappreciated but seismic shifts 
in Fourth Amendment law. First, courts are increasingly invoking consent to 
justify otherwise unconstitutional intrusions upon supervisees, the premise 
being that a defendant consents to surveillance in exchange for avoiding 
incarceration.33 While the debate over criminal justice bargaining is not new, the 
expanded reliance on consent in this context reveals significant blind spots in 
the existing debate. Second, otherwise unconstitutional surveillance is 
increasingly justified based on a general “reasonableness” standard, as opposed 
to traditional exceptions to the warrant requirement.34 
These two shifts, which untether electronic surveillance from any 
meaningful constitutional restraint, set a new precedent that jeopardizes the 
precise privacy interests the Fourth Amendment drafters sought to protect, 
which is discussed later in this piece. Unlike physical searches conducted 
occasionally by police and supervision officers, electronic searches have no 
natural limit and can be conducted continually without defendants knowing if, 
or when, they are being surveilled. The result is a highly racialized panopticon 
of unprecedented proportion.35 Meanwhile, no empirical evidence suggests that 
broadly applied electronic surveillance corresponds to greater public safety, 
increased rehabilitation, or lower recidivism rates.36 Indeed, “probation by 
machine” may in fact lead to greater rates of re-arrest and incarceration, and in 
turn be criminogenic, by focusing on perfect detection and enforcement of 
 
The Distribution] (observing that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has had the unintended 
consequence of lowering the relative cost for state police to observe and invade the privacy of poorer 
individuals). 
 31. ANTHONY C. THOMPSON, RELEASING PRISONERS, REDEEMING COMMUNITIES 144 
(2008). 
 32. See infra Part II. 
 33. See infra Part II. 
 34. See infra Part III. 
 35. See Michelle Alexander, Opinion, The Newest Jim Crow, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/08/opinion/sunday/criminal-justice-reforms-race-technology.html 
[https://perma.cc/6T47-GCG2 (dark archive)] (arguing that “digital prisons are to mass incarceration 
what Jim Crow was to slavery”). 
 36. See KATHRYN SALTMARSH, ILL. SENTENCING POLICY ADVISORY COUNCIL, RESEARCH 
BRIEFING: STATE USE OF ELECTRONIC MONITORING 6–8 (2019). 
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violations of technical rules drafted with the limits of the physical world in 
mind. 
The profound Fourth Amendment implications of invasive electronic 
surveillance of people on probation and parole have, until now, not been well 
examined. While scholars, as well as the mainstream media, have begun to 
expose the hidden costs of electronic monitoring, none of the critiques focus on 
the unique Fourth Amendment problems with this level of broad surveillance.37 
And while other scholars have examined how technology is altering policing and 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, as well as other forms of criminal justice 
surveillance,38 the same robust scrutiny has yet to be applied to surveillance of 
those on community supervision, a unique context because of its perceived status 
as a lenient alternative to incarceration. Additionally, the rich literature on 
probation and parole has yet to address the degree to which surveillance 
technology challenges the traditional legal justifications for diminished privacy 
rights for those on community supervision.39 
 
 37. See Chaz Arnett, From Decarceration to E-Carceration, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 2, 2 (2019); 
Catherine Crump, Tracking the Trackers: An Examination of Electronic Monitoring of Youth in Practice, 53 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 800–01 (2019) (explaining the negative effect of electronic monitoring as a 
net-widening tool); Avlana K. Eisenberg, Mass Monitoring, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 123, 128 (2017) 
(opposing judicial and legislative definitions of electronic monitoring as “merely regulatory”); Ben A. 
McJunkin & J.J. Prescott, Fourth Amendment Constraints on the Technological Monitoring of Convicted Sex 
Offenders, 21 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 379, 419 (2018) (arguing against the tendency to “discount the 
intrusion” of electronic monitoring by comparing it to searches of prisoners’ cells); Weisburd, supra 
note 8, at 305 (noting that electronic monitoring, like other “non-carceral treatment of juveniles,” is 
“rarely subjected to effective legal regulation or rigorous analysis”); James Kilgore & Emmett Sanders, 
Ankle Monitors Aren’t Humane. They’re Another Kind of Jail, WIRED (Aug. 4, 2018), 
https://www.wired.com/story/opinion-ankle-monitors-are-another-kind-of-jail/?verso=true 
[https://perma.cc/M7PJ-HKMU]; Kofman, supra note 6 (describing contract charging defendants ten 
dollars per day to wear an electronic monitoring blanket); Patricia J. Williams, Why Everyone Should 
Care About Mass E-Carceration, NATION (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.thenation.com/article/
surveillance-prison-race-technology/ [https://perma.cc/G527-2MEL] (citing a 2014 case in which a 
defendant’s ankle monitor was removed for the duration of his trial after his attorney filed a complaint 
detailing how police and prosecutors could listen to defendant’s conversations without consent). 
 38. See Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1, 3 
(2008) (describing the nation’s current use of data to prevent crime as a progression that began with 
the War on Terror); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The “Smart” Fourth Amendment, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 
547, 550 (2017) (asking whether a consumer’s smart data is protected by the Fourth Amendment); Joh, 
supra note 29, at 560; Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 
313 (2012) [hereinafter Kerr, The Mosaic Theory] (describing the Supreme Court’s application of 
collective “mosaic” theory to define Fourth Amendment searches); Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and 
the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1084 (2002) (listing types of data 
available to government through data collection). 
 39. For comprehensive critiques of community supervision, see, for example, Fiona Doherty, 
Obey All Laws and Be Good: Probation and the Meaning of Recidivism, 104 GEO. L. J. 291, 294 (2016), for 
an examination of probation systems’ “almost farcical level of control over people’s lives,” and Michelle 
S. Phelps, The Paradox of Probation: Community Supervision in the Age of Mass Incarceration, 35 LAW & 
POL’Y 51, 52–53 (2013) [hereinafter Phelps, The Paradox of Probation], for a description of probation as 
both a net widener and an alternative to traditional incarceration. 
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This Article is the first to interrogate the Fourth Amendment 
consequences of electronic surveillance of people on community supervision. 
Part I chronicles the expansion of electronic surveillance in the context of 
community supervision and why it has flown under the scholarly and legislative 
radar. Part II of the Article documents and critiques the increased use of consent 
as a justification for perpetual electronic surveillance. This part of the Article 
challenges the assumption that defendants freely and knowingly “choose” 
supervision conditioned on electronic surveillance over incarceration and 
reveals how electronic surveillance is often not an alternative to incarceration 
but simply an add-on. Part III examines the erosion of the traditional “special 
needs” warrant exception and the emergence of the “reasonableness” standard 
as a basis to justify electronic surveillance of people on community supervision. 
Part IV then explores the unique way that electronic surveillance reveals deep 
fissures in the reasonableness standard. 
The Article concludes with a prediction and a prescription. The prediction 
is that the increased reliance on consent and general “reasonableness” will 
extend beyond the supervision context, representing a new and troubling 
frontier of sanctioning suspicionless, warrantless searches with no natural limits. 
The prescription is two-fold: (1) require a warrant for electronic surveillance of 
supervisees while retaining the ability to conduct physical searches based on 
“special needs”; and (2) decrease reliance on intensive community supervision 
and electronic surveillance as de facto sentences. This shift would curb net 
widening and help restore community supervision to its proper role as a more 
precisely targeted intervention. 
I.  MECHANISMS OF SURVEILLANCE SENTENCES 
This part both offers an overview of types of surveillance used in 
community supervision and charts the expansion of surveillance, noting the 
extreme dearth of data and research on these subjects.40 This part highlights two 
points. The first is that the expansion does not appear to be the result of 
deliberate policymaking based on rational penological concerns related to 
community supervision. The second is that this unprecedented level of 
surveillance would be unconstitutional under recent Fourth Amendment case 
law related to electronic searches, absent the ability to rely on consent or a newly 
created roving “reasonableness” standard. 
 
 40. This Article is part of a larger research project aimed at better understanding how electronic 
monitoring operates in the criminal legal system. As part of this project, I am collecting agency policies 
that govern the use of electronic monitoring for people on pretrial release, probation, parole, and other 
forms of court supervision. These records include the terms and conditions of electronic monitoring, 
internal agency policies, as well as the contracts between municipalities and private companies that 
provide electronic monitoring services. Many of the agency records referenced in this paper are part 
of this larger research endeavor. 
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A. Taxonomy of Electronic Surveillance in Community Supervision 
Increasingly precise surveillance technology emerges every day. What 
follows are a few common types of surveillance currently used to monitor 
people on probation, parole, and other forms of supervised release.41 
1.  Electronic Monitoring Technology 
All fifty states, the federal government, and the District of Columbia use 
some form of electronic monitoring to track the movement and activities of 
people on pretrial release, probation, and parole.42 According to a Pew 
Charitable Trusts research report, there were about 131,000 people on electronic 
monitors in 2015, which represented a one hundred forty percent increase over 
the prior ten years.43 The number of people on monitors today is likely much 
higher as monitoring has proliferated and expanded to include juveniles and 
people in immigration proceedings.44 
People on community supervision are subject to electronic monitoring in 
several different ways. The first is radio frequency monitoring, which tracks 
whether someone is at a particular location, most often their home.45 This 
system relies on a transmitter worn by a defendant that is connected to a 
landline phone and alerts the probation officer if the defendant leaves his or her 
home.46 The use of this system skyrocketed in the 1980s, and, although it is used 
less now, some states and federal courts continue to rely on it.47 
The second and more widely used technology is a GPS-equipped ankle 
monitor that relies on cell phone towers and satellites to, according to the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police, “pinpoint the actual location of the 
offender and track an offender’s movements over time.”48 The ankle monitors 
 
 41. Although the focus of this Article is the use of electronic surveillance of people on probation 
and parole, the same technology is also used in the context of pretrial release and lifetime GPS 
monitoring of sex offenders. Many of the arguments presented in this Article apply with equal force 
to those settings, but both settings have additional attributes that complicate the analysis and are 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
 42. THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS., supra note 7. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See Kofman, supra note 6. This number also did not include children. For example, in 
California alone there were 10,000 children on electronic monitors in 2017. See Crump, supra note 37, 
at 797. Determining the precise number of people on a GPS monitor should be a high priority for 
future research. 
 45. THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS., supra note 7. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. INT’L. ASS’N. OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, TRACKING SEX OFFENDERS WITH ELECTRONIC 
MONITORING TECHNOLOGY: IMPLICATIONS AND PRACTICAL USES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 3 
(2008). 
98 N.C. L. REV. 717 (2020) 
2020] SUPERVISION BY SURVEILLANCE 727 
vary in size, but most are the size of a cigarette box.49 The accompanying 
software allows the location of people on monitors to be viewed, stored, and 
analyzed by the private company administrating the program, probation and 
parole agents, the police, or some combination thereof.50 Generally, these 
devices must be charged at least once a day.51 Some have the capacity to buzz or 
beep when an officer tries to contact the probationer or if the battery is low.52 
Other varieties of monitors have two-way microphones that allow officials to 
talk with people on monitors at any time.53 
A third form of surveillance involves smartphone applications that allow 
GPS tracking via cell phones and instant communication without the use of a 
GPS-equipped ankle monitor.54 These systems vary but often rely on a GPS-
equipped cell phone and a small ankle strap that must be within the range of 
the cell phone at all times.55 Both the cell phone and strap vibrate and emit 
audible alerts when they are separated.56 Another variation involves a cell phone 
without an ankle monitor and requires the defendant to submit to random and 
frequent voice verification check-ins.57 
Common across these variations is the use of a range of applications that 
allow monitoring of compliance with exclusion zones, curfew, exact pinpoint 
location, and video or photo check-ins. Some applications also allow probation 
 
 49. For images of GPS devices, see BI ExacuTrack One, BI, https://bi.com/products-and-
services/exacutrack-one-gps-monitoring-device-remote-location-technology/ 
[https://perma.cc/7PDV-P2LR]. 
 50. THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS., supra note 7, at 2. 
 51. A number of jurisdictions require that defendants charge their devices at least once a day. See, 
e.g., ADULT PROB. DEP’T, SUPREME COURT OF ARIZ., EXACUTRACK ONE GLOBAL POSITIONING 
SYSTEM (GPS) RULES (2014) (on file with author); BUREAU OF CMTY. CORRS., DEL., DEP’T OF 
CORR., CONDITIONS OF ADDENDUM FOR GPS PROGRAM (2016) (on file with author); COURT OF 
COMMON PLEAS PROB. DEP’T, CUYAHOGA CTY., OHIO, ELECTRONIC MONITORING/GPS 
TRACKING UNIT RULES (2019) (on file with author); DEP’T OF JUSTICE SERVS., ST. LOUIS CTY., 
ELECTRONIC HOME DETENTION CONTRACT/AGREEMENT (on file with author); IOWA DEP’T OF 
CORRS., GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM AND EQUIPMENT ASSIGNMENT RULES (2017) (on file with 
author); OFFICE OF OPERATIONS SUPERVISION PROGRAM, PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCY FOR THE 
D.C., GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS) ONLY CONDITION (2015) (on file with author); 
ORANGE CTY. PROB. DEP’T, TERMS & CONDITIONS FOR CONTINUOUS ELECTRONIC 
MONITORING SUPERVISION VIA GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS) (on file with author). 
 52. Telephone Interview with Rosa Bay, Attorney, East Bay Cmty. Law Ctr. (May 2019).  
 53. Kira Lerner, Chicago Is Tracking Kids with GPS Monitors That Can Call and Record Them Without 
Consent, APPEAL (Apr. 8, 2019), https://theappeal.org/chicago-electronic- monitoring-wiretapping-
juveniles/ [https://perma.cc/FL3B-357D]. 
 54. Mike Nellis, “Better than Human?” Smartphones, Artificial Intelligence and Ultra-Punitive 
Electronic Monitoring 5 (Jan. 29, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://university.pretrial.org/
HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=df5f5a81-7279-d83e-ee43-
6804a006c3fa&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/7R2U-ZPCE]. 
 55. See Shubha Balasubramanyam & Jethro Antoine, Young Offenders, Electronic Monitoring, Cell 
Phones, and Battery Life, J. OFFENDER MONITORING, Summer 2019, at 4, 5. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 5–6. 
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officers to send reminders about court dates, job opportunities, or other 
appointments.58 Still other applications allow for instant breathalyzer tests, with 
the results communicated to officials via Bluetooth technology.59 Related 
technology includes sleep pattern analysis and general motion detection 
analysis.60 
Individual judges, and sometimes probation or parole officers, generally 
have discretion to impose electronic surveillance as a condition of community 
supervision or as a sanction for violations of community supervision, a decision 
which is made either at sentencing or at subsequent status hearings.61 In some 
places, state law mandates that certain classes of individuals be placed on 
monitors.62 People on electronic monitors must also agree to abide by dozens of 
rules, often in addition to the host of separate probation and parole conditions.63 
2.  Electronic Search Conditions and Computer Monitoring 
With increasing frequency, judges and prosecutors require defendants to 
agree to continuous suspicionless searches of their personal electronic devices 
and electronic data as a condition of supervision. These search conditions allow 
law enforcement to monitor supervisees’ e-mail, social media activity, texting, 
location and cell phone usage, and all other information contained on devices, 
twenty-four hours a day. For example, the following language is now common in 
standard plea agreements in some federal jurisdictions: “The defendant shall 
submit his person, residence, office vehicle, electronic devices and their data 
(including cellphones, computers, and electronic storage media), and any property 
under defendant’s control to a search. Such a search shall be conducted . . . at 
any time, with or without suspicion.”64 
 
 58. See Nellis, supra note 54, at 5. 
 59. Several private companies offer this service. See, e.g., Alcohol Monitoring, SENTINEL SERVS., 
https://www.sentineladvantage.com/alcohol-monitoring/ [https://perma.cc/BX46-J3HG]; Visual 
Alcohol Monitoring, HOUSE ARREST SERVICES, https://housearrest.com/products/visual-alcohol-
monitoring [https://perma.cc/4AZ3-J7B5]. 
 60. See INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, supra note 48, at 5. These features are used, 
presumably, by state officials monitoring people on supervision. 
 61. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 214 A.3d 464, 480 (D.C. 2019) (sanctioning the practice of 
probation officers, not judges, deciding if and when to place people on electronic monitors). 
 62. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.520c(2)(b), 750.520n(1) (Westlaw through P.A. 
2019, No. 178, of the 2019 Reg. Sess., 100th Legis.); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.40(b) (2019); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 301.48 (Westlaw through 2019 Act 76). 
 63. For a discussion of these rules, see infra Part II. 
 64. Judgment in a Criminal Case at 5, United States v. Lockhart, No. 3:17-cr-00604-CRB (N.D. 
Cal. Dec. 5, 2018) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (emphasis added) (child 
pornography); see also Judgment in a Criminal Case at 5, United States v. Rodger, No. 4:18-cr-00352-
PJH (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2018) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (sex trafficking of a 
minor); Judgment in a Criminal Case at 5, United States v. Hasme, No. 3:19-cr-00552-WHA (N.D. 
Cal. Feb. 18, 2020) (wire fraud). 
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Even if probation or parole conditions do not explicitly include an 
electronic search condition, some courts have upheld such searches, once they 
occur, as implicitly authorized by general probation and parole search 
conditions.65 
Both electronic monitoring and electronic searches produce a range of 
data, including the person’s exact locations, both real-time and historical, as well 
as the contents of cell phones.66 These data are then relied on by probation, 
parole, and other law enforcement officers as evidence of noncompliance with 
the terms of community supervision, or a new criminal allegation.67 As in United 
States v. Jackson,68 police also often rely on electronic monitoring for crime 
investigation—like identifying who was near a crime scene.69 
Beyond judicial proceedings and police investigations, it is not at all clear 
what happens to the collected data or with whom it is shared. In juvenile courts 
in California, for example, only one county in the state explicitly notes in the 
contract that the data from electronic monitoring will be stored and shared with 
other agencies.70 In adult court, some electronic monitoring rules provide that 
the data is shared with police,71 and conversely, some policies say nothing about 
what happens to the collected data.72 
B. Explaining the Expansion 
No one catalyst explains the increased use of electronic surveillance in 
community supervision. Instead, the expansion has been gradual, irregular, and 
was likely the result of several related forces. In this sense, the expansion 
 
 65. See, e.g., State v. Phillips, 266 So. 3d 873, 878 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019); see also United 
States v. Johnson, 875 F.3d 1265, 1275–76 (9th Cir. 2017) (upholding search of parolee’s cellphone). 
But see In re Ricardo P., 446 P.3d 747, 749 (Cal. 2019) (striking down an electronic search condition 
imposed on a child in juvenile court). 
 66. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018). 
 67. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Johnson, 119 N.E.3d 669, 699 (Mass. 2019) (concluding that 
police reliance on historic GPS-ankle monitor data from when defendant was on probation was 
reasonable). 
 68. 214 A.3d 464, 480 (D.C. 2019). 
 69. In Boston, for example, police routinely rely on electronic monitoring data to “zero in on a 
potential suspect or rule out someone with a record.” Alysha Palumbo, Cameras, GPS Technology Help 
Boston Police Combat Crime, NECN NEWS (Feb. 27, 2014), https://www.necn.com/news/local/_necn
__cameras__gps_technology_help_boston_police_combat_crime_necn/59041/ [https://perma.cc/
DNJ6-CTT9]. 
 70. See LCA ELEC. MONITORING PROGRAMS, SAN FRANCISCO SHERIFF DEPARTMENT 
CLIENT ENROLLMENT PACKET 1, 5 (2019) (on file with author).  
 71. See COURT COMMON PLEAS PROB. DEP’T, CUYAHOGA CTY., OHIO, ELECTRONIC 
MONITORING/GPS TRACKING UNIT RULES (2019) (on file with author).  
 72. See IOWA DEP’T OF CORRS., GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM AND EQUIPMENT 
ASSIGNMENT RULES (2019) (on file with author).  
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mirrors the evolution of probation in general, which has been described as 
“haphazard[] and with no real thought.”73 
First, the expansion of electronic surveillance may be a spillover effect of 
targeted electronic searches of supervisees charged or convicted of a subset of 
serious crimes. For years, people convicted of certain crimes associated with 
computers or the internet have routinely been required to have their computers 
monitored by or provide their passwords to their probation officers. For 
example, people convicted of receiving child pornography through the internet 
may have limitations placed on their internet use while they are on probation.74 
As of 2008, at least twenty-two states had laws requiring that people convicted 
of certain child sex offenses be electronically monitored, and at least six states 
require monitoring for life.75 
In recent years, however, the use of surveillance technology has quietly 
expanded beyond these few crimes. For example, under the First Step Act, 
federal inmates qualified to be released may be placed on house arrest enforced 
by electronic monitoring.76 And until recently, electronic searches and 
surveillance of computers and personal devices were ordered in juvenile court 
in California regardless of the underlying offense.77 Similarly, in Illinois, recent 
research revealed that electronic monitoring was imposed in a wide range of 
cases and not limited to a particular subset of serious offenses.78 
Second, the rise of electronic surveillance may relate to increased pressure 
on municipalities to cut short-term supervision costs and lower incarceration 
rates at the front end rather than focus on quality of supervision and lowering 
long-term recidivism rates.79 Bail reform efforts aimed at either eliminating cash 
bail altogether or making it much easier for people to be released pretrial may 
help explain the impetus for municipalities to find “alternatives” to 
 
 73. Joan Petersilia, Probation in the United States, 22 CRIME & JUST. 149, 157 (1997) (citing DAVID 
J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN 
PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 244 (1980)). 
 74. See, e.g., United States v. Love, 593 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 75. See INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, supra note 48, at 1. 
 76. First Step Act of 2018, Pub. Law No. 115-391, § 102, 132 Stat. 5194, 5211 (to be codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 3624(g)(2)(A)(i) (2018)). 
 77. In re Ricardo P., 446 P.3d 747, 749–50 (Cal. 2019). 
 78. SALTMARSH, supra note 36, at 4. 
 79. See VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE POTENTIAL OF COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS TO 
IMPROVE SAFETY AND REDUCE INCARCERATION 2 (2013), https://www.vera.org/downloads/
Publications/the-potential-of-community-corrections-to-improve-safety-and-reduce-incarceration-
configure/legacy_downloads/potential-of-community-corrections.pdf [https://perma.cc/CA5E-
P8WP]; Andrew Horwitz, The Costs of Abusing Probationary Sentences, Over-Incarceration and the Erosion 
of Due Process, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 753, 760 (2010) [hereinafter Horwitz, The Costs of Abusing]; Julie 
O’Donoghue, Missouri Hopes Local Courts Agree to Electronic Monitoring To Cut Costs, ST. LOUIS PUB. 
RADIO (Sept. 26, 2019), https://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/missouri-hopes-local-courts-agree-
electronic-monitoring-cut-costs [https://perma.cc/42EY-C523].  
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incarceration.80 In some places with newly enacted bail reform, like San 
Francisco and St. Louis, the use of electronic monitoring has steadily increased.81 
Pretrial agencies, advocates, and academics alike have highlighted monitoring 
as a positive alternative to cash bail.82 At least one of the recently elected 
prosecutors, who are seen as part of the “reform prosecutor” movement, has put 
forth a new bail policy that explicitly provides for electronic monitoring as an 
alternative to cash bail.83 
As a result of the increased pressure to lower incarceration rates more 
generally, the growth in the number of people on probation and parole has 
recently, and significantly, outpaced the growth in the prison population.84 At 
the same time, probation and parole agencies have always been historically 
underfunded.85 As caseloads have gone up, probation and parole officers have 
been asked to do more, but with fewer resources.86 Faced with such constraints, 
“officers have little choice but to concentrate on surveillance, and the 
impersonal monitoring of offenders.”87 Faye Taxman, director of the Center for 
Advancing Correctional Excellence at George Mason University, explains that 
“electronic monitoring and other data provide important information that can 
be used in supervision . . .	. This is an untapped resource.”88 
 
 80. See, e.g., Editorial Board, Editorial: New App-Based Defendant-Monitoring Program Is a Promising 
Alternative to Bail, ST. LOUIS TODAY (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.stltoday.com/opinion/editorial/
editorial-new-app-based-defendant-monitoring-program-is-a-promising/article_7466fc29-ef8e-5875-
8567-3372b8a904ff.html [https://perma.cc/7FXJ-A79J].  
 81. Michel Martin, Defendants Often Foot Bill of Costly Electronic Monitors, NPR (July 7, 2019), 
https://www.npr.org/2019/07/07/739357978/defendants-often-foot-bill-of-costly-electronic-ankle-
monitors [https://perma.cc/ST72-97Q5]; Joshua Sabatini, Number of Inmates Released on Electronic 
Monitoring Triples Following Bail Ruling, S.F. EXAMINER (Mar. 20, 2019), 
https://www.sfexaminer.com/the-city/number-of-inmates-released-on-electronic-monitoring-triples-
following-bail-ruling/ [https://perma.cc/PT39-ZXN4]. 
 82. See Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right To Be Monitored, 123 YALE L.J. 1344, 
1364 (2014); Reuven Blau, City Scrambling To Get Electronic Monitors for New Bail Rules, CITY (Jan. 17, 
2020), https://thecity.nyc/2020/01/nyc-scrambling-to-get-electronic-monitors-for-new-bail-rules.html 
[https://perma.cc/7KDH-9JWY]; O’Donoghue, supra note 79 (arguing that the ankle-bracelet program 
would reduce the number of people in jail). 
 83. Press Release, Office of the Mayor, San Francisco Moves Forward with New System To 
Replace Pre-Arraignment Case Bail (Nov. 6, 2019), https://sfmayor.org/article/san-francisco-moves-
forward-new-system-replace-pre-arraignment-cash-bail [https://perma.cc/MLQ5-2GHV]. 
 84. DANIELLE KAEBLE & THOMAS P. BONCZAR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROBATION AND 
PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2015, at 1 (2017), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppus15.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/36DN-MDSX]. 
 85. Petersilia, supra note 73, at 152. 
 86. VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 79, at 11; Christine S. Scott-Hayward, The Failure of 
Parole: Rethinking the Role of the State in Reentry, 41 N.M. L. REV. 421, 439 (2011). 
 87. Scott-Hayward, supra note 86 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Richard P. Seiter, 
Prison Reentry and the Role of Parole Officers, FED. PROB., Dec. 2002, at 50, 51). 
 88. Faye S. Taxman, Community Supervision in the Post Mass Incarceration Era, 79 FED. PROB. 41, 
43 (2015). 
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The third and related trend that may have incentivized and facilitated the 
expansion of electronic surveillance in community supervision is the influence 
of private industry.89 Surveillance technology is a big business.90 For example, 
several large publicly traded companies offer private probation services as well 
as a range of electronic monitoring programs.91 Private companies, with names 
such as “Leaders in Community Alternatives,”92 advertise “evidence-based” 
surveillance services such as “PureTag,” “PureTrack,” and “PureMonitor.”93 
These private services are attractive to jurisdictions looking for ways to cheaply 
but effectively expand community supervision. 
C. Justifying the Expansion 
This section explains why electronic surveillance of this magnitude, absent 
the newly emerging use of consent and general reasonableness as legal 
justifications, would surely be unconstitutional under recent Supreme Court 
cases constraining electronic surveillance. 
The recent Supreme Court decisions in Riley v. California,94 Carpenter v. 
United States,95 and United States v. Jones96 reflect the Court’s growing concern 
with expansive electronic searches. In Riley, the Supreme Court held that cell 
phones generally cannot be searched incident to arrest without a warrant.97 
Although an arrestee has “reduced privacy interests upon being taken into 
police custody,” the Court emphasized that this fact “does not mean that the 
Fourth Amendment falls out of the picture entirely.”98 The Court focused on 
the unique privacy interests related to cell phones and cell phone data and 
concluded that “when ‘privacy-related concerns are weighty enough’ a ‘search 
 
 89. Malcolm M. Feeley, Entrepreneurs of Punishment: How Private Contractors Made and Are 
Remaking the Modern Criminal Justice System – An Account of Convict Transportation and Electronic 
Monitoring, 17 CRIMINOLOGY CRIM. JUST. L. & SOC’Y 1, 24 (2016). 
 90. CHRIS ALBIN-LACKEY, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PROFITING FROM PROBATION: 
AMERICA’S “OFFENDER-FUNDED” PROBATION INDUSTRY 16–17 (2014); Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing 
by Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth Amendment, 89 WASH. L. REV. 35, 66 (2014) [hereinafter Joh, 
Policing by Numbers]; Elizabeth E. Joh, The Undue Influence of Surveillance Technology Companies on 
Policing, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 30–33 (2017), https://www.nyulawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/08/NYULawReviewOnline-92-Joh_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/R675-Z23M];. 
 91. See Carl Takei, From Mass Incarceration to Mass Control, and Back Again: How Bipartisan 
Criminal Justice Reform May Lead to a For-Profit Nightmare, 20 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 125, 154–
55 (2017); Weisburd, supra note 8, at 333. 
 92. See LEADERS IN COMMUNITY ALTERNATIVES, https://www.lcaservices.com 
[https://perma.cc/3LXE-YRWL]. 
 93. See GPS Tracking, LEADERS IN COMMUNITY ALTERNATIVES, https://www.lcaservices.com/
copy-of-electronic-mointoring [https://perma.cc/279W-YTRH]. 
 94. 573 U.S. 373 (2014). 
 95. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
 96. 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 97. Riley, 573 U.S. at 403. 
 98. Id. at 392. 
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may require a warrant, notwithstanding the diminished expectations of privacy 
of the arrestee.’”99 
In Carpenter, the Court expressed similar concerns with respect to the 
privacy implications of searching historic cell phone location data. The Court 
observed that when the government tracks the location of a cell phone, “it 
achieves near perfect surveillance, as if it had attached an ankle monitor to the 
phone’s user.”100 These concerns explain the Court’s decision to limit the third-
party doctrine and instead require a warrant for the search of historic location 
data at issue in Carpenter.101 As privacy expert Orin Kerr recently noted, 
“Carpenter signals a new kind of expectation of privacy test, one that focuses on 
how much the government can learn about a person regardless of the place or 
thing from which the information came.”102 
Similarly, in Jones, the Supreme Court relied on comparable logic in 
holding that a GPS-tracking device attached to a suspect’s vehicle constituted a 
search.103 The privacy concerns expressed by Justice Sotomayor in her 
concurrence could apply with equal force to any type of government 
surveillance: 
[T]he government’s unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal 
private aspects of identity is susceptible to abuse. The net result is that 
GPS monitoring—by making available at a relatively low cost such a 
substantial quantum of intimate information about any person whom the 
government, in its unfettered discretion, chooses to track—may “alter 
the relationship between citizen and government in a way that is inimical 
to democratic society.”104 
If there is one common theme uniting Jones, Riley, and Carpenter, it is that 
“[d]igital [i]s [d]ifferent.”105 As a result, Fourth Amendment case law is 
adapting, or, as Kerr describes it, experiencing an “equilibrium-adjustment” in 
which Fourth Amendment law responds to “the digital age to restore the earlier 
balance of government power.”106 Indeed, the logic behind limiting the third-
party doctrine in Carpenter flows from the recent recognition that when people 
use modern indispensable digital devices like cell phones, there is no voluntary 
 
 99. Id. (quoting Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 463 (2013)). 
 100. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218. 
 101. Id. at 2223. 
 102. Orin Kerr, Implementing Carpenter in THE DIGITAL FOURTH AMENDMENT (forthcoming 
2020) (manuscript at 6) [hereinafter Kerr, Implementing Carpenter] (on file with the North Carolina 
Law Review). 
 103. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 407 (2012). 
 104. Id. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 
285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., concurring)). 
 105. Granick, supra note 24. 
 106. Kerr, Implementing Carpenter, supra note 102 (manuscript at 8). 
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disclosure in a “meaningful sense.”107 Increased privacy protections for location 
data is not limited to court decisions. The intrusiveness of government 
electronic surveillance was precisely what the California Legislature intended to 
limit when it passed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
(“CalECPA”).108 The Act, arguably the most sweeping in the country,109 requires 
that law enforcement obtain a search warrant to track the location of private 
electronic devices and to search the data contained on them or on the internet.110 
But these privacy-protective adjustments to digital Fourth Amendment 
law have not been applied to people on probation and parole—ironically the 
exact group that is in fact wearing the ankle monitor invoked by Chief Justice 
Roberts in Carpenter,111 and is in fact routinely subject to the cell phone searches 
condemned in Riley. To be sure, Kerr proposes that the protections of Carpenter 
should apply when three requirements are met: (1) the records were made 
available because of “surveillance methods of the digital age”; (2) the records are 
not the “product of a user’s meaningful voluntary choice”; and (3) the records 
are of a type that “tends to reveal an intimate portrait of a person’s life beyond 
the legitimate interest of criminal investigations.”112 While these requirements 
would seem easily met by electronic surveillance of supervisees, the protections 
of Jones, Riley, and Carpenter have not been extended to people on probation and 
parole. For example, soon after CalECPA went into effect, San Diego judges 
began asking defendants to sign waivers allowing probation and police officers 
to search their electronic devices without a warrant or even any suspicion of 
wrongdoing.113 The state legislature soon followed suit. In 2017, CalECPA was 
amended to clarify that the new protections did not apply to someone who is on 
parole or “subject to an electronic device search as a clear and unambiguous 
condition of probation, mandatory supervision, or pretrial release.”114 
Courts have similarly refused to extend the holdings in Riley, Jones, and 
Carpenter to those on community supervision.115 The closest the Supreme 
 
 107. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018). 
 108. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, ch. 651, 2015 Cal. Stat. (codified as amended at 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(c)(1) (Supp. 2020)).  
 109. Kim Zetter, California Now Has the Nation’s Best Digital Privacy Law, WIRED (Oct. 8, 2015), 
https://www.wired.com/2015/10/california-now-nations-best-digital-privacy-law/ 
[https://perma.cc/2V5S-UYC2].  
 110. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(c)(1) (Supp. 2020). 
 111. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.  
 112. Kerr, Implementing Carpenter, supra note 102 (manuscript at 3). 
 113. Dana Littlefield, Does Digital Privacy Extend to Criminals on Probation?, SAN DIEGO UNION 
TRIB. (Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-court-waiver-cellphone-
passwords-search-privacy-2016jan15-story.html [https://perma.cc/6S6G-HWFK]. 
 114. § 1546.1(c)(10). 
 115. See, e.g., United States v. Lambus, 897 F.3d 368, 412 (2d Cir. 2018); United States v. Pacheco, 
884 F.3d 1031, 1043 (10th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 278 (2018); United States v. Johnson, 875 
F.3d 1265, 1275 (9th Cir. 2017); Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 935 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. 
Bare, 806 F.3d 1011, 1018 n.4 (9th Cir. 2015); United States v. Jackson, 214 A.3d 464, 478 (D.C. 2019); 
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Court has come to addressing electronic searches was when it concluded that 
GPS monitoring of people convicted of certain sex offenses constituted a search 
under the Fourth Amendment and remanded the case to the lower court to 
determine if the search was reasonable.116 Similarly, a statute that barred those 
convicted of certain sex offenses from accessing social media was struck down 
as infringing on free speech. In doing so, the Court expressed the importance 
of the internet as the “vast democratic forum[]” and to “foreclose access to social 
media altogether is to prevent the user from engaging in the legitimate exercise 
of First Amendment rights.”117 
Traditionally, courts justified probation searches based on the “special 
government needs” exception to the warrant requirement. This exception 
applies when “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make 
the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.”118 The special 
needs exception consists of a two-part inquiry: first, whether the search is being 
conducted for a non-law enforcement purpose and, second, if there is a non-law 
enforcement purpose, whether the search is reasonable.119 Warrantless searches 
of public-school students120 and public employees,121 as well as sobriety check 
points,122 to name a few, have all been upheld pursuant to the special needs 
exception. 
The “special needs” of Wisconsin’s probation department was what the 
Court relied on in upholding a warrantless search of a probationer in Griffin v. 
Wisconsin,123 one of the first probation-search cases. The “special need[]” the 
Court referred to was probation’s function as a “period of genuine rehabilitation 
and that the community is not harmed by the probationer’s being at large.”124 
The Court concluded that this “regime” would be “unduly disrupted by a 
requirement of probable cause.”125 Still, the majority in Griffin made clear that 
a warrantless probation search must be justified by “reasonable grounds” to 
 
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 119 N.E.3d 669, 680 (Mass. 2019); State v. Kane, 169 A.3d 762, 774 (Vt. 
2017). But see United States v. Lara, 815 F.3d 605, 612 (9th Cir. 2016) (invalidating suspicionless search 
of probationer’s cell phone as unreasonable where the suspected probation violation was missing a 
probation appointment); In re Ricardo P., 446 P.3d 747, 754 (Cal. 2019) (invoking Riley as part of the 
basis to strike down an electronic search condition).  
 116. Grady v. North Carolina, 575 U.S. 306, 309–10 (2015). 
 117. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735, 1737 (2017). 
 118. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 119. Id. at 351–54. 
 120. Id. at 347–48 (majority opinion). 
 121. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 726 (1987). 
 122. Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990). 
 123. 483 U.S. 868 (1987). 
 124. Id. at 875. 
 125. Id. at 878. 
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believe the area searched will contain contraband and that the ability to infringe 
on a probationer’s privacy is “not unlimited.”126 
Even this qualified approach drew strong criticism from Justice Blackmun 
who, in his dissent, questioned the majority’s “curious assumption that the 
probationer will benefit by dispensing with the warrant requirement.”127 This 
criticism foreshadowed what would ultimately come to fruition: when it comes 
to probation and parole searches, the line between the “special” needs of 
community supervision and traditional law enforcement purposes is hard, if not 
impossible, to discern.128 For example, the D.C. Court of Appeals in the Jackson 
case upheld electronic monitoring of people on probation as a special needs 
search,129 while the Supreme Court of North Carolina found that electronic 
monitoring of people convicted of sex offenses was not a special needs search.130 
Given these line-drawing problems, the special needs doctrine is not often 
relied on to justify electronic surveillance. Instead, courts most often invoke 
one or both of the following justifications for suspicionless and warrantless 
searches: consent and general “reasonableness.” In the next two parts, I address 
why the emergence of these two justifications is doctrinally concerning. 
Electronic surveillance, in particular, brings into sharp focus the deep fissures 
in the consent and “reasonableness” doctrines. 
II.  “CONSENSUAL” SURVEILLANCE SENTENCES 
Perhaps because electronic searches are distinctively more invasive than 
an occasional physical search, courts—with more frequency—are now invoking 
consent as a justification, either by itself,131 or in combination with a relaxed 
totality-of-the-circumstances approach.132 Although many scholars and jurists 
 
 126. Id. at 875. 
 127. Id. at 886 (Blackmun J., dissenting). 
 128. Barry Friedman & Cynthia Benin Stein, Redefining What’s “Reasonable”: The Protections for 
Policing, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 281, 294 (2016) (observing that “the special needs test has proven 
incapable of coherent application”). 
 129. United States v. Jackson, 214 A.3d 464, 467 (D.C. 2019). 
 130. State v. Grady, 372 N.C. 509, 525–26, 831 S.E.2d 542, 556 (2019). 
 131. See, e.g., United States v. McCoy, 847 F.3d 601, 605 (8th Cir. 2017) (upholding electronic 
search clause because defendant agreed to it as a condition of release); People v. Nachbar, 3 Cal. App. 
5th 1122, 1129 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (upholding electronic search condition on grounds that defendant 
“accepted probation in lieu of additional punishment”); People v. Thornburg, 895 N.E.2d 13, 23–24 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (upholding computer search term based on defendant’s consent to the terms); State 
v. Gonzalez, 862 N.W.2d 535, 542 (N.D. 2015) (upholding computer search condition on the grounds 
that “the probationer consents to warrantless searches . . . when he accepts the conditions of 
probation”). 
 132. See, e.g., United States v. Lambus, 897 F.3d 368, 412 (2d Cir. 2018); United States v. Bare, 
806 F.3d 1011, 1018 n.5 (9th Cir. 2015); People v. Smith; 8 Cal. App. 5th 977, 986 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017); 
State v. White, 890 N.W.2d 825, 829 (N.D. 2017); State v. Keller, 893 N.W.2d 276, 278–79 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 2017). 
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have opined on the problems with consent-based searches,133 consensual 
electronic surveillance of people on community supervision brings to light 
additional concerns. This part of the Article charts the emergence of the consent 
justification for electronic surveillance of people on community supervision and 
then demonstrates why it developed in a way that is doctrinally unsound. 
A. The Rise of Consent 
Consent, either on its own or as a factor, has recently emerged as an oft-
invoked justification by government officials for imposing otherwise 
unconstitutional electronic searches or surveillance of people on community 
supervision.134 The consent is usually either explicit (for example, a defendant 
agrees to an electronic search condition as part of a plea agreement or condition 
of probation)135 or implicit (for example, a defendant agrees to a traditional 
search condition that is later determined to include electronic searches).136 
Consent takes other forms as well. For example, people placed on electronic 
monitors are usually required to sign a contract or sign their initials, indicating 
that they agree to, or are at least aware of, the rules governing the monitoring 
program.137 These rules often include a provision that failure to comply or the 
decision to opt out of the program may result in incarceration.138 
 
 133. See generally Alafair S. Burke, Consent Searches and Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, 67 FLA. 
L. REV. 509 (2015) (analyzing the reasonableness test and consent searches); Philip Hamburger, 
Unconstitutional Conditions: The Irrelevance of Consent, 98 VA. L. REV. 479, 480 (2012) (concluding that 
“consent is irrelevant for conditions that go beyond the government’s power”); Nirej Sekhon, Willing 
Suspects and Docile Defendants: The Contradictory Role of Consent in Criminal Procedure, 46 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 103 (2011) (providing a framework for reforming “fictional consent”); William J. Stuntz, 
Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553 (1992) 
(supporting the special needs doctrine and analogizing to contract law). 
 134. See McCoy, 847 F.3d at 605 (upholding electronic search clause because defendant agreed to 
it as a condition of release); Nachbar, 3 Cal. App. 5th at 1129 (upholding electronic search condition on 
grounds that defendant “accepted probation in lieu of additional punishment“); Thornburg, 895 N.E.2d 
at 23–24 (upholding computer search term based on defendant’s consent to the terms); Gonzalez, 862 
N.W.2d at 542 (upholding computer search condition on the grounds that “the probationer consents 
to warrantless searches . . . when he accepts the conditions of probation”); State v. Kane, 169 A.3d 762, 
776 (Vt. 2017) (upholding electronic monitoring on grounds that defendant “agreed” to it as a condition 
of probation). 
 135. See, e.g., McCoy, 847 F.3d at 605. 
 136. State v. Lietzau, No. 2 CA-CR 2018-0011, 2019 WL 1323981, at *5 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 
2019). 
 137. See, e.g., STATE OF HAW. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, COR.14.22, ELECTRONIC MONITORING 
SERVICE CORRECTIONAL POLICY (Mar. 30, 2016), https://dps.hawaii.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2012/10/COR.14.22.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PFG-B9DW]; see also COURT OF 
COMMON PLEAS PROB. DEP’T, CUYAHOGA CTY., OHIO, ELECTRONIC MONITORING/GPS 
TRACKING UNIT RULES (2019) (on file with author); DEP’T OF JUSTICE SERVS., ST. LOUIS CTY., 
ELECTRONIC HOME DETENTION CONTRACT/AGREEMENT (on file with author); IOWA DEP’T OF 
CORRS., GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM AND EQUIPMENT ASSIGNMENT RULES (2017) (on file with 
author). 
 138. See sources cited supra note 137.  
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Although lower courts increasingly rely on consent as a legal basis to 
impose probation and parole searches, the Supreme Court has declined to 
resolve the question of consent each of the two times it was given the 
opportunity to do so. United States v. Knights139 presented the first such 
opportunity. In that case, the Court granted certiorari on the precise question 
of whether Mr. Knights’s agreement to a probation condition allowing for 
warrantless searches constituted valid consent.140 And yet, the Court made a 
point to “not decide whether Knights’ acceptance of the search condition 
constituted consent” because it concluded that the search was reasonable under 
a “general Fourth Amendment approach of ‘examining the totality of the 
circumstances.’”141 
Despite the Court’s explicit decision not to address consent, it implicitly 
suggested that being “aware” of a search condition is relevant to the general 
reasonableness test. The Court focused on the fact that Mr. Knights was 
“unambiguously informed” of the search condition, the fact which “significantly 
diminished [his] reasonable expectation of privacy.”142 The Court observed that 
the “judge who sentenced Knights to probation determined that it was necessary 
to condition the probation on Knights’ acceptance of the search provision.”143 
Although simply being aware of a probation condition is not the same as 
consenting to it, the Court’s reasoning seems premised on the assumption that 
Mr. Knights could have—but did not—object to it. Being “informed of” and 
“accepting” terms are certainly species of consent. 
Oral argument from Knights further reveals the Court’s concerns with 
consent in the context of probation. Justice Souter, for example, seemed to 
question the utility of labeling probation an “agreement” because in some cases 
a defendant is ineligible for a sentence of incarceration or has, in effect, been 
ordered onto probation, allowing no opportunity to actually “agree” to the 
individual terms of probation.144 Justices Ginsberg and Stevens also appeared to 
be concerned that consent in cases where a defendant could face jail time is 
coercive and may be an unconstitutional condition.145 These varied views may 
explain why the Court did not ultimately rule on consent grounds and instead 
relied on a general reasonableness standard. 
The second time the Court addressed, but did not resolve, the question of 
consent-based community supervision searches was five years later in Samson v. 
 
 139. 534 U.S. 112 (2001). 
 140. See Brief for Respondent at 1, Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (No. 00-1260). 
 141. Knights, 534 U.S. at 118 (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996)). 
 142. Id. at 120. 
 143. Id. at 119. 
 144. Transcript of Oral Argument at 9–10, Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (No. 00-1260). 
 145. Id. at 23. 
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California.146 In Samson, the Court concluded that a parole search was reasonable 
even though there was no suspicion for the search.147 The Court’s focus this time 
was on the significantly diminished expectations of privacy for people on parole 
as compared to people on probation. Like in Knights, the Court did not explicitly 
resolve the question of consent but did focus on the fact that Mr. Samson 
“signed an order submitting” to the search condition and was thus 
“unambiguously’ aware of it.”148 Nonetheless, the Court made clear in a footnote 
that it was not invoking the special needs doctrine or consent because the search 
was deemed “reasonable” under a totality-of-circumstances test.149 
Despite the Court having yet to rule on the legality of consent-based 
searches, there is a near-perfect circuit split as to whether consent, and consent 
alone, is sufficient to justify a probation or parole search. On one side, many 
lower courts have found that explicit search conditions constitute a valid waiver 
of Fourth Amendment rights.150 And yet other courts have firmly rejected the 
notion that a warrantless search condition is “the price the government may 
exact in return for granting probation.”151 Courts have found, and judges have 
argued, that the search conditions were essentially nonconsensual, not that 
consent, if voluntary, is an insufficient justification.152 
The next section provides an argument that this reliance on consent is not 
only contrary to the realities on the ground, in terms of the voluntariness of the 
choice, but also—even assuming “knowing and voluntary” consent—is an 
illegitimate justification for such searches, outside a narrow subset of offenses. 
B. Concerning Consent 
The consent justification rests on the general premise that probation is “an 
act of clemency and grace” and that “[b]ecause a defendant has no right to 
probation, the trial court can impose probation conditions that it could not 
 
 146. 547 U.S. 843 (2006). 
 147. Id. at 846. 
 148. Id. at 852. 
 149. Id. at 852 n.3. 
 150. See, e.g., United States v. Barnett, 415 F.3d 690, 691–92 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding that a 
“blanket waiver of Fourth Amendment rights” was valid since “imprisonment is a greater invasion of 
personal privacy than being exposed to searches of one’s home on demand”); People v. Woods, 981 
P.2d 1019, 1023 (Cal. 1999) (“In California, probationers may validly consent in advance to warrantless 
searches in exchange for the opportunity to avoid service of a state prison term.”). 
 151. United States v. Lara, 815 F.3d 605, 609 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 152. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Coleman v. Smith, 395 F. Supp. 1155, 1157 (W.D.N.Y. 1975) 
(holding that a consent-search provision in a parole agreement was coercive and involuntary); Roman v. 
State, 570 P.2d 1235, 1241–42 (Alaska 1977) (holding that released defendants do not voluntarily consent 
to all conditions of parole); see also People v. Reyes, 968 P.2d 445, 457–58 (Cal. 1998) (Kennard, J., 
concurring) (arguing that suspicionless searches of parolees cannot be justified by consent if a 
prospective parolee does not have freedom to accept or reject parole); Guiney v. Police Comm’r, 582 
N.E.2d 523, 531 (Mass. 1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (concluding that consent to search is “virtually 
meaningless unless the consent requirement [is] ‘reasonable’”). 
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otherwise impose.”153 The presumption is that “[i]f the defendant finds the 
conditions of probation more onerous than the sentence he would otherwise 
face, he may refuse probation.”154 Thus, otherwise onerous probation conditions 
have been upheld on the grounds that a probationer can always reject 
probation.155 
To date, both litigants and jurists have yet to focus on how consent is 
uniquely problematic in the context of electronic surveillance of people on 
community supervision. This section posits that blanket use of consent is 
troubling on two levels. First, many people’s decision to consent to search 
conditions or electronic monitoring cannot be said to be “knowing” or 
“voluntary” under even the most forgiving, government-friendly conceptions of 
those terms. Defendants, just like most people, underappreciate the risks of 
complex electronic searches, a concern that is ever-present in all criminal justice 
bargaining but heightened in the digital privacy arena.156 Second, electronic 
monitoring and search conditions are very often “add-ons” rather than 
bargained-for conditions in exchange for a real reduction in harshness of 
punishment. 
1.  The Lack of a “Knowing” and “Voluntary” Waiver 
The first problem with consent is that a defendant’s acceptance of 
electronic surveillance as a condition of supervision may be neither knowing nor 
voluntary, even under traditional waiver doctrine, which generally defers to free 
market principles. It is axiomatic that the legal rights of the accused are “subject 
to waiver by voluntary agreement of the parties.”157 The rights of a criminal 
defendant “serve as just another kind of bargaining chip,”158 where waiver of 
rights is treated as simply part of the “mutuality of advantage” that characterizes 
plea negotiations.159 Applying this doctrine, courts have accepted as valid the 
 
 153. People v. Anderson, 235 P.3d 11, 20 (Cal. 2010); see also People v. Ebertowski, 228 Cal. App. 
4th 1170, 1175 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (upholding computer search term because “[a]dult probationers, in 
preference to incarceration, validly may consent to limitations upon their constitutional rights” 
(internal quotation omitted) (quoting People v. Olguin, 198 P.3d 1, 7 (Cal. 2008))). 
 154. Anderson, 235 P.3d at 20. 
 155. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 414 F.2d 630, 636 (5th Cir. 1969) (explaining that defendant 
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probation,” the defendant had to “endure its restrictions”); see also Andrew Horwitz, Coercion, Pop-
Psychology, and Judicial Moralizing: Some Proposals for Curbing Judicial Abuse of Probation Conditions, 57 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 75, 84–90 (2000) [hereinafter Horwitz, Coercion]. 
 156. See generally Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 
126 HARV. L. REV. 1879 (2013) [hereinafter Solove, Privacy Self-Management] (proposing ways to 
square privacy law and consent). 
 157. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 203 (1995). 
 158. Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 801, 845 (2003). 
 159. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (“[P]lea bargaining flows from ‘the 
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trial” (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970))). 
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waiver of a host of fundamental trial rights as a condition of pleas.160 Yet even 
under traditional waiver doctrine, consent assumes transparency, equal access to 
knowledge, and opportunity for defendants to make a decision that is in their 
own best interest.161 
However, some people subject to electronic surveillance never literally 
“choose” surveillance as an alternative to incarceration. For example, probation 
and parole are frequently part of mixed sentences—usually, a defendant will be 
sentenced to a jail or prison term, in addition to a term of probation or parole.162 
In the federal system, as well as in some state systems, defendants cannot “opt 
out” of supervision; they are sentenced to a prison term followed by a 
mandatory term of supervised release.163 In such cases, even though the 
defendant has not explicitly consented to the conditions of supervision, courts 
will often impose or uphold supervision terms as implicitly consensual in the 
sense that the defendant has acquiesced to a sentence that includes a term of 
supervision. Furthermore, the term of supervised release is on top of a period 
of incarceration and does not replace the prison sentence. In this way, 
supervised release is not an alternative to prison. And yet, the very term “search 
condition” linguistically reflects an assumption that community supervision is 
always a privilege because the alternative would be jail—even if the reality is 
that a defendant has no actual choice.164 
Even if a defendant chooses probation or parole as an alternative to 
incarceration, he might not have all of the information necessary to choose 
between supervision conditioned upon electronic surveillance and a prison 
sentence. The legal and practical implications of waiving Fourth Amendment 
rights are opaque and not obvious. For example, people contemplating plea 
offers are often unaware of the full collateral consequences of a conviction.165 As 
in other contexts, such as Miranda warnings, waiver assumes an understanding 
of the benefits and risks.166 
 
 160. See, e.g., Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal Pragmatist’s Guide to Loss, 
Abandonment and Alienation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2011, 2029 (2000). 
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 162. Doherty, supra note 39, at 339–42. 
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Moreover, in the context of conditions attached to plea offers, where the 
alternative is to go to trial and face a potentially harsher sentence, defendants 
rarely have access to all the pertinent facts about the evidence in their case or the 
likelihood of prevailing at trial.167 Indeed, in some jurisdictions, defendants 
accept guilty pleas (and the attendant conditions) without ever speaking to an 
attorney.168 And even if a lawyer is available, many court-appointed attorneys 
are underresourced and have little time to explain the consequences of various 
options.169 Indeed, the scene is a familiar one: a defendant speaks with his 
attorney in the hallway or in a holding cell, and a few minutes later, he pleads 
guilty.170 At sentencing the judge lists off the conditions of a plea, not further 
inquiring if the defendant understands such conditions. Although it is unknown 
how often electronic monitoring is part of a plea agreement, the rate of plea 
agreements is undisputedly high—roughly ninety percent of all criminal cases 
are resolved through plea agreements.171 
In short, few meaningful opportunities exist for defendants to gain the 
necessary information before waiving procedural rights as part of a plea or offer 
of a more lenient sentence. To state this proposition is not to suggest that 
defendants lack personal agency. Rather, the criminal legal system, arguably by 
design, provides limited opportunities for people to meaningfully exercise 
agency and make decisions that are in their own best interest.172 As other 
scholars have observed, the field upon which pleas and probation conditions are 
negotiated is rarely level and the bargaining power between prosecutor and 
defendant is rarely equal.173 While the appropriate response to these 
asymmetries of power is not necessarily to invalidate all plea agreements, a 
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recognition of such imbalances should loom large over any proposal upholding 
“consent” as a blanket justification without further scrutiny. 
These ever-present concerns about ignorance, misinformation, and 
rationality in traditional plea bargaining are compounded in the context of 
electronic surveillance conditions. Professor Paul Schwartz has noted that 
“citizens are often unaware of, or unable to evaluate, the increasingly 
sophisticated methods devised to collect information about them.”174 
Appreciating the risks of electronic surveillance is uniquely challenging. And as 
Professor Daniel Solove has observed, “Despite the embrace of notice and 
choice, people do not seem to be engaging in much privacy self-management”; 
instead, people “routinely turn over their data for very small benefits.”175 One 
interpretation of such failure to self-protect might be that people do not care 
about privacy. But as Professors Solove, Chris Hoofnagle, Jan Whittington, and 
others have shown, poor privacy decisions are driven mostly by misinformation, 
misunderstanding, and underappreciation of downstream risks—not because 
people devalue privacy.176 
2.  The Lack of a True Discount: Unconstitutional Conditions 
a. The Failure To Focus on “Wrongful Coercion” in the Absence of a True 
Discount 
Both sides of the recurring debate over criminal justice bargaining agree 
that deals are invalid unless they are knowing and voluntary. But once a decision 
to accept a deal meets these requirements, the sides diverge and take two paths 
of reasoning, both problematic. This section argues that both sides of the debate 
have incorrectly focused on whether a reasonable defendant feels free to say no 
to a condition that avoids incarceration. Instead, the correct focus should be on 
whether the condition offers a true discount off of the sentence that the 
defendant would have otherwise been entitled to receive. 
One side of the existing debate over criminal justice bargaining—the 
winning side, thus far—views bargaining between the prosecution and a 
defendant as unproblematic so long as the defendant’s decision to accept a deal 
is “knowing” and “voluntary” in the sense that it is informed by accurate 
information and that the defendant has the ability to refuse the deal.177 Under 
this view, so long as a defendant has the ability to “refuse probation” if he “finds 
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the conditions of probation more onerous than the sentence he would otherwise 
face,”178 the deal is unproblematic. 
This logic, however, has a limit. In other contexts, the mere fact that a 
waiver of a right is knowing and voluntary does not render it legally 
unproblematic. If the bargain is not a true discount from what the bargainer 
should fairly expect otherwise, then the deal is still problematic, even if it is 
knowing and voluntary. This “unconstitutional conditions”179 doctrine “reflects 
the triumph of the view that government may not do indirectly what it may not 
do directly”180 and has been applied by courts in several contexts outside 
criminal law.181 
For example, imagine if the Governor of California decided to condition 
the granting of state park passes on California residents’ willingness to waive 
their Fourth Amendment rights and submit to routine continuous suspicionless 
electronic surveillance. The state park pass is clearly a privilege, not a right—
the state of California could constitutionally decline to have parks at all or could 
constitutionally decline to allow human access to them, keeping them as wildlife 
refuges. But to condition such a privilege on the waiver of a constitutional right 
would presumably run afoul of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. While 
the current doctrinal standard for what does and does not constitute such an 
unconstitutional condition remains infamously murky at best,182 the park pass 
example would surely be illegal under any conception of the test. The condition 
is not “related” to the state’s decision to grant a pass,183 and in a world where 
imposing electronic surveillance were not a possibility, the state would surely 
just grant the park passes unconditionally rather than withholding them. 
There seems to be little reason, aside from inertia and tradition, not to 
recognize such wrongfully coercive conditions as invalid in the criminal justice 
context as well. While there may be difficult questions to address in terms of 
which deals run afoul of the doctrine and what the right baseline is, the idea 
that such reasonable limits on conditional offers would have no application in 
the criminal context makes little sense. While scholars such as Mitch Berman 
and Josh Bowers have persuasively argued that the doctrine is applicable in the 
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plea-bargaining context,184 the argument has gained little traction in 
challenging plea agreements in real criminal cases and has generated little 
scholarship outside of the plea-bargaining context.185 
On the other side of the debate, critics of criminal justice bargaining have 
equally failed to recognize that in some situations a plea offer may in fact reflect 
a “true discount” thus making the plea less coercive. Instead, critics and litigants 
have almost exclusively relied on the argument that a choice between “freedom 
and prison” is inherently coercive because the alternative of prison is so harsh 
that no defendant would ever refuse the deal. For example, in his dissent in 
Samson, Justice Stevens characterized the notion of a parolee’s consent to 
suspicionless physical searches as “sophistry” and that to speak of consent when 
the choice is freedom or prison is to “resort to a ‘manifest fiction.’”186 
This critique, though perhaps intuitive, is both over- and underinclusive 
and fails to recognize the crux of the problem. The mere fact that an offer is too 
good to refuse, given the “unpleasant alternative[],” should be neither necessary 
nor sufficient to render a criminal justice bargaining process invalid.187 A plea 
deal that is the product of a fully informed choice and offers a true discount off a 
harsher sentence that a defendant would otherwise justifiably receive should not 
be condemned as inherently problematic simply because a reasonable defendant 
would find it difficult to refuse the deal. While it may be difficult to discern 
what constitutes a “justifiable” sentence, evidence such as sentencing guidelines 
and historical charging data could provide insight into what sentence a properly 
motivated prosecutor would have sought in a world without the condition at 
issue. If the deal really is a discount and accepting is a knowing and voluntary 
choice, then the only remaining reasons to disallow the deal would seem to be 
unconscionability or inherent objections to commodifying certain rights.188 
b. Why Electronic Surveillance May Not Be a True Discount 
For most people on some form of community supervision, warrantless 
electronic searches and surveillance often offer no real discount. The baseline in 
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many probation and parole cases—that is, the sentence the state would 
legitimately seek if electronic searches were not an option—is not prison. 
Instead, most supervisees would likely still receive probation or parole.189 In this 
way, people agreeing to an electronic search condition do not get any sentence 
“discount” because there is no actual benefit.190 The ostensible benefit—
avoiding incarceration—places the defendant in no better stead than he would 
have been absent the state’s ability to condition release on accepting an electronic 
search condition.191 In turn, where the threatened penalty for rejecting the offer 
is as harsh as incarceration, most people—though technically able to reject the 
deal—are likely to accept the unconstitutional search condition. 
Perhaps these concerns have motivated the few courts that have invoked 
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to invalidate otherwise consensual 
searches of nonincarcerated defendants.192 For example, the Ninth Circuit 
determined that consent could not be the sole basis to uphold an otherwise 
unreasonable search conducted pursuant to a pretrial release agreement.193 In its 
opinion, the court cautioned that giving “the government free rein to grant 
conditional benefits creates the risk that the government will abuse its power by 
attaching strings strategically, striking lopsided deals and gradually eroding 
constitutional protections.”194 But these cases are outliers. In the end, if the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine is not widely recognized as applicable to 
conditions imposing surveillance on the nonincarcerated, then there seems to 
be literally no limit to the state wielding consent to justify any surveillance 
measure.195 
Whatever doctrinal label one chooses—an unconstitutional condition, an 
unduly coercive “contract of adhesion,” or simply “involuntary”—electronic 
surveillance conditions should not be treated as a freely made choice simply 
because they are technically a condition on an offer of a nonprison sentence. 
C. Should Privacy Be Subject To Bargaining? 
It may also be that electronic surveillance should not be a bargaining chip 
to begin with. If one agrees with the premises underlying Carpenter, Riley, and 
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the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act, then electronic 
surveillance might be viewed as so unprecedented and invasive that to offer it 
up as something to be bargained away would be unconscionable.196 While 
limited surveillance in some particular subset of serious crimes might be 
appropriate, some may characterize a bargain that contracts away one’s right to 
be free of broad invasive surveillance of everyday communication as 
unconscionable. 
The problem of forcing people to choose between privacy and everyday 
cell phone use was one of the key factors in the Court’s decision to limit the 
third-party doctrine in Carpenter. Chief Justice Roberts, in writing for the 
majority, focused on the pervasiveness of cell phones to conclude that there is 
no voluntary disclosure in a “meaningful sense” because cell phone use is so 
widespread and “there is no way to avoid leaving behind a trail of location 
data.”197 This concern with the lack of meaningful “choice” adds credence to the 
argument that perhaps privacy in one’s cell phone and own movements is not 
something that should be up for bargaining.198 
In both the commercial and criminal contexts, asymmetries abound 
“between data collectors and the individuals whose personal information is 
collected.”199 When it comes to making a decision about sharing personal data, 
“people often favor immediate benefits even when there may be future 
determents . . .	. [P]rivacy is an issue of long-term information management, 
while most decisions to consent to the collection, use, or disclosure of data are 
tied to a short-term benefit.”200 The problem of short-term gain in exchange for 
potential long-term pain is analogous to defendants agreeing to invasive search 
conditions as a way to avoid a prison sentence. 
These concerns have led privacy scholars to suggest ways of limiting the 
alienability of privacy rights while not completely eliminating the ability to 
bargain.201 These solutions include codifying basic privacy norms; invoking 
contract principles, such as default rules; establishing the right to exit; and 
creating institutions to monitor privacy violations.202 It is not entirely clear how 
these solutions could map onto criminal justice bargaining, where defendants 
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often have very little bargaining power to secure the most favorable outcome. 
While comprehensively applying the principles of property and privacy law to 
criminal justice bargaining is beyond the scope of this Article, much can be 
learned from examining the degree to which certain rights are considered 
alienable. 
III.  “REASONABLE” SURVEILLANCE SENTENCES 
Along with the rise of consent as a justification, the emergence of the 
general reasonableness standard reflects a trend toward state surveillance 
untethered from meaningful Fourth Amendment protections. This part 
explores the erosion of the special needs doctrine and how it has been replaced 
with the general reasonableness test. I then explain why this development is 
doctrinally unsound. Finally, I argue that, even under the ill-construed 
reasonableness test, electronic surveillance should be more often construed as 
unreasonable. 
A. The Evolution of “Reasonable” Community Supervision Searches 
The emergence of the general “reasonableness” justification for electronic 
surveillance reflects a significant shift in Fourth Amendment law that 
reverberates well beyond the situations at issue in Knights and Samson—the two 
cases that first articulated the reasonableness standard. As discussed in Part I, 
warrantless probation searches were initially justified under the special needs 
exception to the warrant requirement.203 Yet, most courts today do not invoke 
the special needs doctrine, and the last time the Supreme Court relied on the 
special needs doctrine in the context of community supervision was in 1987.204 
So, why did the Court abandon the special needs exception as the justification 
for probation and parole searches? 
There is a two-part explanation for why the Supreme Court may have 
made such a sharp turn from special needs to reasonableness in justifying 
routine probation and parole searches. First, and perhaps most obvious, the 
searches in both Knights and Samson were carried out by law enforcement 
officers for purposes of crime solving, and, thus, it would have been 
disingenuous to label either search as being carried out as part of the probation 
or parole institution. Indeed, the government in Knights did not even argue that 
the search was justified on special needs grounds. From reviewing the pleadings 
and oral argument, it appears that the parties, as well as the Court, may have 
assumed that the special needs doctrine was beside the point precisely because 
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of the law-enforcement nature of the search.205 This conclusion makes sense as 
the special needs exception does not apply when “the immediate objective” of 
the search is “to generate evidence for law enforcement purposes,” even if the 
“ultimate goal” is to further a goal other than general crime control.206 What 
remains a puzzle is why the inquiry did not end there. If the searches in Knights 
and Samson were clearly for law enforcement purposes, why didn’t the Court 
simply conclude that they were “per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment”?207 
The second part of the explanation may provide an answer: the shift to 
reasonableness was both piecemeal and, according to some scholars, doctrinally 
incoherent.208 In Knights, although the Court invoked a general reasonableness 
standard, the search was supported by reasonable suspicion and, therefore, the 
Court was not staking out dramatically new doctrinal territory. And in Samson, 
decided five years later, there was no suspicion to support the warrantless 
search, but the Court highlighted the unique status of parolees as having less 
liberty than those on probation. Although both holdings were intended to be 
limited (Samson was limited to parolees, and Knights was limited because there 
was reasonable suspicion in that case),209 together the cases are applied much 
more broadly. Today, most lower courts reviewing various forms of electronic 
surveillance do so on the Samson/Knights reasonableness test.210 
The emergence of a general reasonableness test is part of what Professor 
David Sklansky calls the Court’s “new Fourth Amendment originalism,” which 
focuses on what was considered unreasonable at the time the Fourth 
Amendment was adopted.211 The Court’s focus on reasonableness is also in 
accord with scholars, such as Akhil Reed Amar, who posit that the Fourth 
Amendment does not require warrants; on the contrary, the Framers were 
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skeptical of general warrants.212 Instead, Amar argues, the Fourth Amendment’s 
chief concern is that searches be reasonable.213 
What does Samson mean for the future of warrantless searches and, in 
particular, electronic surveillance of people in the criminal legal system? As 
Cynthia Lee has observed, the “Court today stands at a crossroads” between 
adherence to the warrant requirement on the one hand and embracing a pure 
reasonableness standard on the other.214 While many jurists and scholars have 
challenged Amar’s view of the Fourth Amendment, these critiques have not yet 
been applied in the context of electronic surveillance of people on community 
supervision; that is the topic I turn to next. 
B. Problematizing the “Reasonableness” of Surveillance Sentences 
Electronic surveillance, in particular, reveals the degree to which the 
general reasonableness standard allows for “unbridled discretion”215 that has no 
natural limit. As pointed out by the dissent, Samson marked the first and only 
time the Supreme Court has upheld “an entirely suspicionless search 
unsupported by any special need.”216 Scholars have likewise noted that Samson 
removed any protection against “discretionary and suspicionless searches” of 
any subpopulation with reduced privacy rights.217 
Electronic surveillance reveals two additional and underappreciated 
concerns with the reasonableness standard. First, the reasonableness balancing 
test is “very deferential to the government, and the resulting searches are almost 
always deemed reasonable.”218 As Professors Barry Friedman and Cynthia 
Benin Stein have argued, “The Court’s idea of ‘balancing’ is illusory—the test 
is rigged such that the government almost always wins.”219 This is especially 
true when it comes to people on probation and parole: the government’s stated 
interest in preventing recidivism and protecting the community will almost 
always trump the privacy interest of people on community supervision—a 
group of people who already have diminished rights.220 As Professor Carol 
Steiker has pointed out, evaluating a search on general reasonableness grounds 
slides “very easily into the familiar constitutional rubric of ‘rational basis’ 
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review—a level of scrutiny that has proven to be effectively no scrutiny at all.”221 
As a result, the reasonableness test “is a poor approach for protecting a 
constitutional right.”222 
This deference to government interests explains why, in post-Samson 
probation and parole search cases, the searches are almost universally upheld as 
“reasonable.”223 It is challenging to argue that “‘monumental’ interests of law 
enforcement”224 do not outweigh the already diminished privacy rights of 
people on community supervision. For example, courts post-Samson have 
upheld suspicionless DNA profiling of people on probation and parole as being 
reasonable, precisely because of the strong government interests in solving 
crime.225 As one judge cautioned in a dissent in one such case, by relying only on 
a reasonableness standard to justify suspicionless law enforcement searches, the 
Fourth Amendment becomes “little more than an afterthought as the 
government seeks to conduct more and more invasive general programs in the 
name of law enforcement.”226 
The second problem with the test is that when it comes to electronic 
surveillance, reasonableness is a “boundless” standard.227 In writing for the 
majority in Samson, Justice Thomas emphasized that California law forbidding 
“arbitrary, capricious or harassing” searches guarded against searches conducted 
“at the unchecked ‘whim’ of law enforcement.”228 And yet, the nature of 
expansive electronic surveillance of people on probation and parole is, in many 
ways, arbitrary and harassing.229 Unlike physical searches, electronic 
surveillance is invisible and people do not know when they are being searched 
or watched. Electronic surveillance also monitors not just those in the criminal 
legal system but everyone with whom they communicate or associate.230 And as 
discussed below, electronic monitoring allows for the perfect surveillance of 
inevitable imperfections with the many rules governing community 
supervision.231 Monitoring tracks not just compliance with the technical terms 
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of release, it collects and stores a perfect digital trail—capturing data on people’s 
location that arguably has nothing to do with probation or parole. In these ways, 
electronic surveillance reflects a form of “arbitrary, capricious or harassing” 
searches that are nonetheless justified as “reasonable.”232 
The “opaque”233 and “malleable”234 nature of the reasonableness standard 
also offers little in terms of consistency or guidance to lower courts.235 This lack 
of guidance may explain why two lower courts came out differently on a nearly 
identical question: whether continuous GPS monitoring of parolees is 
reasonable. Although the Supreme Court recently found in Grady v. North 
Carolina236 that lifetime GPS monitoring constituted a search, it remanded the 
case on the question of whether the search was reasonable.237 On remand, the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina found that GPS monitoring was not 
reasonable because of the “State’s inability to produce evidence of the efficacy 
of the lifetime [monitoring] program in advancing any of its asserted legitimate 
State interests.”238 In contrast, the Seventh Circuit upheld GPS monitoring as 
reasonable because of the strong law enforcement interests.239 Perhaps the 
difference in case outcomes can be explained by the difference in facts, but it is 
also the case that a general reasonableness test lends itself to being applied 
inconsistently across jurisdictions. As Cynthia Lee points out, the lack of 
guidance is surprising given that “on numerous occasions the Court has spoken 
of the importance of having bright line rules.”240 
C. Applying Reasonableness 
The above critiques notwithstanding, even under a general reasonableness 
test, courts should more often rule that blanket use of electronic search 
conditions and electronic monitoring is unreasonable. This section makes the 
case that Jones, Riley, and Carpenter should force a recalibration of evaluating the 
reasonableness of electronic surveillance of people on community supervision. 
Considering what is now known (and not known) about the capacity of digital 
surveillance, which is beyond what was possible with the physical searches at 
issue in Samson, the balance between government interests versus privacy 
intrusions now tips in favor of greater privacy protection. 
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1.  Significant Privacy Intrusion 
One of the most common factors in evaluating the reasonableness of 
probation and parole searches, including electronic surveillance, is the fact that 
people on community supervision have a “significantly diminish[ed]” 
reasonable expectation of privacy.241 And yet, as any criminal procedure student 
knows, this logic is circular: People’s expectations of privacy depend on 
expectations set, at least to some degree, by the government. As the late William 
Stuntz observed, “[B]y altering its behavior, the government can change how 
people expect it to behave. Thus, if the government is bound only to respect 
people’s expectations, it is not bound at all, for it can easily condition the 
citizenry to expect little or no privacy.”242 This is especially true in the context 
of probation and parole, where the expectation of privacy is dictated by the 
official imposing the search condition or the GPS device. As Stuntz opines, the 
more important question—especially in the context of surveillance—is a 
normative one: What should a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy be?243 
In Carpenter, the Court began to answer that normative question: People 
should, in fact, enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in their digital trail.244 
And yet, as noted in Part I, this change in the Court’s conception of expectations 
of privacy has not been extended to those on probation and parole. But it should 
be. 
a. Privacy as Refuge 
As other scholars have observed, invasive electronic surveillance 
exemplifies Jeremy Bentham’s vision of the modern panopticon in which the 
“fear of being watched inhibits transgression.”245 Indeed, the “‘panoptic gaze’ of 
constant government surveillance is arguably the most dangerous threat to 
personhood and citizenship” in modern life.246 Continuous electronic 
surveillance of one’s movements, as well as data and communications, however, 
takes the panopticon one step further: the government is not just watching or 
threatening to watch but is actually “analyzing and drawing connections 
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between data.”247 As Professor Daniel Solove has observed of the mosaic theory, 
“[L]ittle bits of innocuous data can say a lot in combination.”248 
Electronic surveillance of people on community supervision is an 
unprecedented blow to privacy of the nonincarcerated. With respect to 
electronic searches, much of our private lives is lived online and smartphones 
create a record of everything. Cell phone use, as well as the amount of data 
stored on them, has risen dramatically. Cellphone ownership is no longer 
limited to the wealthy; cell phones are now used by over ninety percent of 
adults.249 For example, most Americans do their banking and manage health 
records online.250 As the Riley Court observed, cell phones are “now such a 
pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars 
might conclude they were an important feature of human anatomy.”251 
These privacy concerns apply equally to GPS-equipped ankle monitors. 
In her concurrence in Jones, Justice Sotomayor cautioned against the extensive 
use of GPS surveillance because “it generates a precise, comprehensive record 
of a person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, 
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”252 This, in turns, alters 
“the relationship between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to 
democratic society.”253 
The nature of electronic surveillance, as compared to physical searches, 
also demonstrates the uniquely invasive quality of electronic searches.254 In the 
Riley Court’s words, “Before cellphones, a search of a person was limited by 
physical realities and tended as a general matter to constitute only a narrow 
intrusion on privacy.”255 With respect to a typical probation search of a house, or 
a drug test that is a condition of probation, a defendant knows when he is being 
searched, tested, or monitored. And because it is a physical impossibility for law 
enforcement to constantly conduct physical searches or follow someone around 
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twenty-four hours a day, a natural limit exists on the amount of searching that 
occurs. 
Electronic surveillance, in contrast, allows law enforcement, with the click 
of a mouse, to access immense amounts of personal, otherwise private, 
information at any time of day and without notice to the defendant.256 The 
search of a cell phone “would typically expose to the government far more than 
the most exhaustive search of a house: A phone not only contains in digital form 
many sensitive records previously found in the home; it also contains a broad 
array of private information never found in a home in any form.”257 Texts to 
family, emails to friends, political posts on social media, and confidential 
communication with doctors, for example, are all viewable at all times. And 
unlike a physical search of a home, GPS-equipped electronic monitoring means 
that people’s movement “will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that 
enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their political and 
religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”258 In short, “[r]ather than a targeted 
query for information,” electronic surveillance “is often akin to casting a giant 
net, which can ensnare a significant amount of data beyond that which was 
originally sought.”259 
While Jones, Riley, and Carpenter focused on the rights of suspects, nothing 
about the Court’s discussion of the unique attributes of cell phones or GPS 
tracking devices rested on the special status of arrestees. Instead, the privacy 
costs articulated by the Court apply equally to any user of personal electronic 
devices or any person forced to wear an electronic monitor. Regardless of the 
owner’s status as a suspect, arrestee, probationer, or parolee, cell phones and 
electronic monitors are rich with private information about nearly all aspects of 
life. 
The electronic privacy concerns for people on probation and parole are 
also heightened because they are already, for the most part, subject to probation 
conditions that allow for unannounced warrantless searches of their home, 
property, and person.260 By virtue of being on probation or parole, they already 
live their lives under a microscope. Electronic surveillance means that people 
on probation or parole have little remaining sectors of their lives shielded from 
the government’s view. 
Being on a GPS ankle monitor also triggers significant dignity costs. Many 
people who have been on an electronic monitor describe it as a “shackle” that is 
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suffocating.261 Federal District Court Judge Jack B. Weinstein referred to 
electronic monitoring as tracking a person as if he “were a feral animal.”262 As 
long as GPS devices remain the size they currently are, they also act as a “scarlet 
letter,” which, as one judge observed, “will undoubtedly cause panic, assaults, 
harassment, and humiliation.”263 Clothes do not completely hide the devices, 
“especially given the need to regularly recharge and maintain the device’s GPS 
connection.”264 One young person on a monitor complained that the device 
buzzed in class, prompting his teacher to ask him why he was wearing the 
monitor.265 Another young person was turned away from a charter school when 
the principal saw the GPS monitor on his ankle.266 And people on monitors 
report that potential employers see the monitor and tell them to reapply once 
the monitor is removed.267 
The privacy implications are significant not just for people on probation 
and parole but for everyone with whom they communicate and associate.268 It 
is well documented that “permissive parole search jurisprudence” leads to more 
searches of parolees’ nonparolee neighbors, which means that entire neighborhoods 
have dramatically lessened Fourth Amendment rights.269 In many jurisdictions, 
police accompany probation officers doing probation searches precisely because 
the ability to search is so much greater in the probation context.270 
Electronic surveillance amplifies the privacy intrusions for third parties. 
The search of a cell phone reveals potentially incriminating statements by the 
person subject to the search and by anyone with whom they communicate. Such 
a search is a powerful tool in a police officer’s toolbelt: more likely than not, 
more than one person may make incriminating statements that are then 
recorded on multiple phones. Similarly, electronic monitoring implicates not 
just the person wearing the device but the other people with whom they 
associate or visit with. As one woman who spent time on a monitor explained, 
the “people who have not done anything are constantly being incarcerated with 
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the person [wearing the monitor]. Whoever lives in that house is being policed 
in that jail.”271 Thus, courts and scholars should acknowledge the collateral 
damage to others’ privacy from broad electronic surveillance of supervisees. 
Some might argue that those on community supervision are not akin to 
the arrestees and suspects in Jones, Riley, and Carpenter, given that people on 
probation and parole have been convicted of crimes and suspects are still 
presumed innocent. However, this difference, without more, cannot logically 
justify a dramatically different level of Fourth Amendment protections. In fact, 
a suspect for whom police have probable cause to believe committed a crime 
should arguably have fewer privacy rights than a probationer or parolee who has 
been restored to the normalcy of living and working in the community and 
suspected of no new wrongdoing and is not in a custody situation where the 
search is necessary for officer safety. 
b. Discouraging Dissent 
Warrantless government surveillance of people on community supervision 
risks chilling speech, as well as freedom of association and movement. Constant 
monitoring of one’s digital life and communications constitutes what Neil 
Richards has termed “intellectual surveillance,” a species of monitoring that is 
“especially dangerous because it can cause people not to experiment with new, 
controversial, or deviant ideas.”272 Because supervisees know they are being 
potentially searched at all times,273 electronic surveillance—more than physical 
surveillance—“shapes and restricts behavior.”274 And because the courage to 
dissent is often a challenge, “[d]issent’s fragile lifecycle—from formulation to 
ferment—requires privacy and often confidential association to flourish.”275 
Moreover, while monitoring by commercial entities is one thing, monitoring by 
the state of a supervisee, who already understands he is one step away from 
incarceration upon revocation, might presumably have an even more dramatic 
dampening effect on would-be dissent. 
By further stripping those on community supervision of personal agency 
and voice, constant surveillance arguably hastens the “civil death” associated 
with criminal convictions.276 To be this closely watched and, by extension, 
limited in what you say or do, is part of the “degradation ceremony”277 associated 
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with a criminal conviction. This intellectual surveillance may also contribute to 
what Monica Bell has termed “legal estrangement,” in which communities of 
color experience detachment and alienation from the state, and ultimately 
exclusion from the legal protections of society.278 
Ultimately, government monitoring of speech and movement jeopardizes 
democracy and political discourse by discouraging free flow of ideas and, in 
particular, dissent.279 Those being watched cannot as meaningfully participate 
in the “vast democratic forums of the [i]nternet,”280 or really any form of 
democracy.281 Thus, “the worth of information privacy accrues” not only to the 
individual but ultimately to society.282 Taken to extremes, the stifling of dissent 
through surveillance can eventually sound the death knell for a democracy; in 
Justice Brennan’s phrasing, surveillance “makes the police omniscient; and 
police omniscience is one of the most effective tools of tyranny.”283 
To the extent that misdemeanor practice and community supervision of 
low-risk defendants are modern means of managing certain populations,284 the 
stifling of dissent in this subpopulation is particularly concerning.285 Many 
people on community supervision already have criminal records that, 
depending on the jurisdiction, preclude them from exercising their political 
voice through alternative means such as voting and jury service. Over six 
million Americans are currently disenfranchised because of a criminal record.286 
Roughly thirty percent of African American men are prohibited from jury 
service because of a criminal record.287 Thus, it is precisely this population that 
may have the most to lose from the inability to speak freely and criticize the 
very government apparatus that arrested, charged, prosecuted, and now 
surveilles them. 
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c. Racialized Intrusions 
Because of the rehabilitative and probation-as-privilege rhetoric 
surrounding community supervision, the racial inequity reinforced by 
electronic surveillance may be more insidious than the inequity of mass 
incarceration, which has been more thoroughly documented.288 And yet, as a 
community activist J. Jhondi Harrell explains, an ankle monitor invokes the 
“sign of an old slave shackle” and a “throw-back to slavery.”289 In many ways, 
electronic searches and surveillance are another method of social control that, 
by design, exert supervision over portions of the population deemed in need of 
“correction.”290 In Jonathan Simon’s words, the “othering” of people in the 
criminal legal system is historically racialized,291 and warrantless electronic 
surveillance represents another method of controlling the “other.” 
As with virtually every aspect of the criminal legal system, invasive 
electronic surveillance of supervisees disproportionally impacts communities of 
color.292 In some neighborhoods, more than half of Black men are under 
correctional control, many on some form of probation or parole.293 The history 
of surveillance is likewise racialized. From the FBI monitoring leaders of the 
Civil Rights Movement to the surveillance of Movement for Black Lives, 
“people of color have been the disproportionate victims of unjust 
surveillance.”294 The parallels between surveillance today and slavery are ever 
apparent, as “[m]onitoring the movement of slaves was a central concern for 
plantation masters and slave patrollers.”295 As activist and monitoring expert 
James Kilgore explains, “[T]he data points of a GPS map are the modern 
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equivalent of ‘lanterns law’ that forced Black and Indigenous people in New 
York to carry candles if they travelled after dark—only the lights of data points 
never really go out.”296 In these ways, electronic surveillance represents one of 
the newest forms of crime management and social control.297 Such searches 
allow for “aggregate control and system management” not just of individuals 
but of entire groups and subpopulations.298 
Surveillance in the criminal legal system has always been, at least to some 
degree, racialized. The concept of needing to monitor so as to enable reentry 
assumes an “unruly” group that requires correction. This same “rabble 
management” approach299 gave rise to the “broken windows” theory of crime-
control,300 as well as aggressive police tactics like stop-and-frisk and using 
misdemeanors as a form of social control.301 These practices were ostensibly race 
neutral, and some argued that these policies benefited communities of color, but 
the reality, as observed by scholars, was that these policies had the opposite 
impact.302 Instead of solving crime and aiding in rehabilitation, these search-
and-apprehend approaches of crime control inflict a form of state-sanctioned 
violence on communities of color, further subordinating and disenfranchising 
historically oppressed groups. 
The ways in which electronic surveillance chills speech and association 
might also be viewed as a form of racialized degradation.303 As Professors Devon 
Carbado and Mitu Gulati point out in their book, Acting White?, “as a matter of 
both socialization and formal or informal political advice, African Americans 
are encouraged to signal cooperation by giving up their privacy” when 
confronted by law enforcement.304 In this way, warrantless electronic searches 
are not just about the loss of control over private information but also the ways 
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that these searches “can build habits of dehumanization and brutality in the 
institutions and officials carrying” them out.305 
It is worth asking whether the solution may be a more egalitarian 
distribution of diminished privacy rights—“equitable surveillance”306—across 
all racial groups, an extension of the “all of us or none of us” position recently 
articulated by several scholars.307 This solution might look like more people, not 
less, being subject to electronic search conditions and surveillance. Professor 
Bennett Capers, for example, makes a compelling argument that expanding 
“soft” police surveillance techniques308—such as public surveillance cameras and 
more terahertz scanners—would help deracialize policing because this 
technology is not prone to implicit bias or unconscious racism.309 It is less 
obvious if this reasoning holds true when the surveillance technology is more 
invasive, less “soft,” and depends on law enforcement to implement, enforce, 
and interpret. 
2.  Limited Government Interests 
Having revealed the significant privacy interests at stake, I turn next to 
the purported government interests in electronic surveillance of people on 
community supervision. The most commonly stated government interests are 
rehabilitation and reducing recidivism. And yet, as a threshold matter, there is 
virtually no empirical evidence that electronic surveillance furthers these 
goals—if anything, there are reasons to believe that surveillance undermines 
these otherwise noble goals. 
a. Undermines Rehabilitation 
Expansive and invasive electronic surveillance is part of an overall regime 
shift in community supervision that prioritizes automated, hypertechnical 
surveillance over more individualized and, in theory, rehabilitative 
approaches.310 While scholars have theorized about the ways that community 
supervision results in net widening and undermines, rather than promotes, 
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successful societal reentry,311 these concerns are amplified when electronic 
surveillance becomes a convenient, omniscient, and perpetual means to monitor 
strict compliance with probation and parole terms. 
To fully appreciate the impact of electronic surveillance on the efficacy of 
probation as a penal intervention, one should bear in mind three fundamental 
features of the modern probation and parole system. First, probation and parole 
departments are historically underfunded and have increasingly high 
caseloads.312 As previously noted, while the number of people on some form of 
community supervision has dramatically increased, the number of probation 
and parole officers has not.313 Probation and parole departments are being 
required to do more with less. 
Second, at the same time, the number of conditions of probation and 
parole has significantly increased.314 Those on community supervision are now 
ordered to comply with dozens of rules as standard practice, some very detailed 
and some very broad.315 Standard conditions include regularly reporting for 
probation office visits, notifying officers of address or job changes, not 
associating with people who have been convicted of felonies, not using or 
possessing alcohol or drugs, working regularly or attending school, paying 
probation fees and fines, supporting dependents, not leaving the state or county 
without permission from probation, abiding by curfew, obeying orders to “stay 
away” from certain people or places, providing DNA samples, and participating 
in certain drug and alcohol treatments.316 While any one condition may seem 
reasonable, the cumulative effect “imposes a nearly impossible burden.”317 At 
any point, anyone on probation could be out of compliance with some of the 
conditions that prohibit both criminal and noncriminal behavior.318 
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Additional rules are imposed for people ordered to wear monitors. In 
many jurisdictions, people on electronic monitors are subject to house arrest 
and may need permission from their probation or parole officer before leaving 
their house or changing their schedule.319 Other jurisdictions require that people 
on monitors obtain permission before changing employment, “required 
treatment,” and/or residence; that they maintain a working landline; and that 
they regularly charge their monitoring device.320 The sheer number of distinct 
rules is also notable. In Alaska, St. Louis, and Seattle, for example, people on 
electronic monitoring are subject to over thirty separate rules governing 
electronic monitoring.321 
Third, many probation terms are so broadly or vaguely worded that what 
constitutes a violation is highly discretionary. For example, as Professor Fiona 
Doherty discovered, the jurisdictions with the largest probation populations—
Georgia, Texas, and California—all have broad “good conduct” terms that 
include “[b]e of [g]eneral [g]ood [b]ehavior,” do not “become abandoned to a 
vicious life” and “[a]void injurious and/or vicious habits.”322 In addition to the 
general “be good” terms, several states prohibit people on probation from 
spending time with “persons having known criminal records” and require them 
to either work full time or be in school.323 These terms are sufficiently broad 
that any range of everyday noncriminal conduct could be construed as a 
violation. Whether certain conduct triggers a formal violation is left to the 
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discretion of individual probation officers with little guidance; and these 
“‘street-level’ discretionary decisions” often go unscrutinized.324 
Taken together, these features reveal a regime primed to prioritize 
supervision techniques that favor technical compliance over time-intensive 
human interaction. High caseloads and limited budgets, coupled with the 
discretion afforded to probation officers to document violations of increasingly 
harsh terms, have given rise to a new type of hypercompliance.325 
In the context of hypercompliance, electronic surveillance allows for 
perfect detection of inevitable imperfections. This type of surveillance is 
arguably analogous to red-light cameras, except that the penalty is often 
incarceration rather than a two hundred dollar ticket.326 In addition, unlike 
regulations against running red lights, the conditions of probation are so 
numerous and broadly worded that documenting a violation based on an 
electronic search or a GPS monitor is presumably like shooting fish in a barrel. 
As one probation expert observed: “If I have 100 percent surveillance capacity, 
I’m going to find problems, and then I’m going to have to respond to them.”327 
Furthermore, an “agent conducting a search or seizure no longer need to be 
physically located in the same place as the target of the search or seizure.”328 As 
a result, expansive electronic surveillance tends to focus attention on the 
defendant’s rule compliance, obscuring or relegating to the background 
deficiencies within public institutions, such as schools, probation, and parole. 
Expansive electronic surveillance, with its emphasis on strict rule 
compliance, exemplifies the way that the “rehabilitative functions associated 
with parole have atrophied.”329 Indeed, electronic searches and monitoring are 
not inherently rehabilitative in nature—they are merely tools that purport to 
facilitate supervision,330 giving probation officers and police “wide latitude in 
deciding how to press for compliance.”331 For example, people who have spent 
time on electronic monitoring report being arrested when they failed to get 
permission to leave their house to go to a last-minute doctor’s appointment or a 
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job interview.332 Ultimately, when parole or probation officers focus on 
managing through technical requirements, “[s]uch technocratic rationalization 
tends to insulate institutions from the messy, hard-to-control demands of the 
social world.”333 
The expanded search power that comes along with electronic surveillance 
further undermines what are often already strained relationships between 
probation and parole officers and their supervisees.334 In Griffin v. Wisconsin,335 
decided long before the advent of cell phones, Justice Blackmun, in his dissent, 
observed the irony of using rehabilitation as the justification for removing the 
warrant requirement: 
I fail to see how the role of the probation agent in “foster[ing] growth 
and development of the client” is enhanced the slightest bit by the ability 
to conduct a search without the checks provided by prior neutral review. 
If anything, the power to decide to search will prove a barrier to 
establishing any degree of trust between agent and “client.”336 
Justice Blackmun just as easily could have been referring to warrantless 
electronic surveillance. GPS-monitoring and electronic searches send the 
message to supervisees that their supervising officers are less focused on 
meaningful reentry and more focused on “closely monitoring offenders to catch 
them when they fail to meet all required conditions.”337 And from the officer’s 
perspective, this level of “intrusive surveillance” can cause the monitoring agent 
“to dehumanize and depersonalize the people they search or surveil.”338 
Intensive surveillance may also chill communication that would otherwise 
facilitate the rehabilitation process. People on community supervision rely on 
cell phones and other electronic devices as a lifeline to reentry and 
reintegration. More than ever before, it is through smart phones, computers, 
and the internet that people on probation and parole connect to jobs, social 
services, health care providers, education, and more. Indeed, social media and 
the internet offers a “relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for communication 
of all kinds.”339 And yet, warrantless surveillance may undermine this otherwise 
healthy exchange of information. 
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b. Increases Recidivism 
Suspicionless electronic surveillance likely contributes to greater rates of 
rearrest and reincarceration, not necessarily for new criminal offenses, but for 
technical rule violations.340 Although the degree to which this happens has yet 
to be studied, and is beyond the scope of this Article, higher arrest rates based 
on expansive electronic surveillance are an example of what scholars warn about 
as a danger of piling on collateral consequences in addition to prison and jail 
sentences.341 When courts place numerous probation conditions and restrictions 
on low-risk defendants, the result is probation violations for minor infractions 
that are often unrelated to public safety.342 These violations are rarely attributed 
to the excessive “piling on” problem; instead the fault is placed on the defendant 
for not taking advantage of reentry services. And violations do not impact all 
people on probation and parole equally. Leading researchers have found that 
non-white people on probation are subjected to higher rates of probation 
revocation.343 
At the same time, resource-strapped probation and parole agencies are 
often ill-equipped to address violations through any consequence other than 
incarceration. On the front end, there are fewer resources and staff for 
meaningful and individualized support (such as treatment programs, 
educational opportunities, job training or counseling). According to one 
national study, for example, “over two-thirds of probationers reported using 
drugs in the past; nearly a third reported use in the month before” the 
conviction that lead to probation.344 And yet only seventeen percent of those 
respondents received any substance abuse treatment while on probation.345 
The consequence of more easily detected violations is often incarceration. 
On the back end, agencies are so underfunded that they cannot “respond to 
technical violations in a graduated or nuanced way.”346 Because there are so few 
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resources in the community, probation and parole officers “default to the most 
available option they have—the most expensive and punitive option—the formal 
violation process which often results in jail or prison.”347 In this way, electronic 
searches contribute to a catch-22: more is expected of people on community 
supervision; noncompliance is more easily detected; and at the same time, there 
are fewer resources to support those on community supervision, both to avoid 
a violation in the first place and as a response to a violation. As Professor 
Michelle Phelps’s research demonstrates, people on probation who have more 
resources and privilege tend to fare better while “their less advantaged 
counterparts are funneled deeper into the criminal justice system.”348 
In short, increased surveillance capabilities may contribute to increased 
recidivism rates, not for new criminal offenses but for rule violations that often 
have little do to with public safety. Indeed, it is well settled that probation and 
parole violations account for a large percentage of prison admissions.349 In some 
states, more than one in three people in prison are there for technical 
supervision violations, such as a failed drug test or failure to report to a 
probation appointment.350 These violations become a gateway to months (if not 
years) of cycling in and out of incarceration, reflecting a “closed circuit of 
perpetual marginality.”351 
c. Lack of Outcome Evidence 
There is no evidence that more surveillance effectively addresses any of 
the underlying problems that may have triggered someone’s entry into the 
criminal legal system. There is also no data demonstrating that greater 
surveillance leads to greater public safety. If anything, most mainstream news 
stories about electronic monitoring focus on people who cut off the monitor 
before committing a new crime.352 Of the very few studies that do exist, some 
make claims about effectiveness, but these studies are small in scale and fail to 
compare outcomes between people on monitors and similarly situated groups not 
on monitors.353 
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There is, however, emerging research concluding that electronic 
monitoring leads to worse outcomes.354 As two researchers from the Brookings 
Institute observed, “False positive alerts overwhelm corrections officials, 
‘tamper-proof’ devices can be circumvented, and technical glitches interfere 
with users’ ability to hold down a job.”355 Similarly, a pilot project for 
monitoring court-involved youth in New York City was plagued with technical 
problems, including problems with battery life, the ability to charge the devices, 
and cell phone reception in a large urban area.356 The monitoring devices also 
alerted the young people through a beep that was so disruptive at school that 
one participant was asked to leave class.357 A recent study by the Illinois 
Sentencing Policy Advisory Council likewise found that the use of electronic 
monitoring “can increase the risk of technical violations and returns to prison, 
especially for low- or moderate-risk offenders.”358 People who have worn ankle 
monitors also worry that the devices will malfunction or prove unreliable.359 
There is also little evidence that placing more people on electronic 
monitors corresponds to less crowded jails and prisons.360 In San Francisco, for 
example, bail reform triggered an increase in the use of electronic monitoring, 
but there was no parallel dip in the jail population.361 While other factors may 
help explain this phenomenon, the data does not appear to support the 
proposition that more people on electronic monitors means fewer people in jail. 
Part of the reason there is so little empirical evidence is that the use of 
electronic surveillance is opaque. The opacity of electronic surveillance flows 
from a few sources. First, there is no meaningful oversight, much less judicial 
review, of the processes that lead to electronic surveillance. For example, 
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prosecutors and judges are provided wide latitude in plea negotiations362 and 
setting terms of supervised release.363 In at least one jurisdiction, Washington, 
D.C., it is often probation officers—not judges—deciding who is placed on a 
monitor and for how long.364 No mechanism exists to track conditions of 
probation or the specific terms of the several thousand plea agreements that are 
processed in the United States each year.365 
Second, it is challenging to evaluate the full impact of electronic 
surveillance because implementation is left to the several thousand probation 
and parole agencies throughout the United States.366 The extent to which 
electronic surveillance mechanisms are relied on, and how, is the product of 
thousands of administrative decisions and exemplifies how the parameters of 
searches are increasingly “designed through administrative policies.”367 
Third, the expansion of the criminal legal system through private industry, 
rather than more transparent public decisionmaking processes, also frustrates 
any effort to collect and analyze data. Relatedly, with private industry driving 
reform, it is impossible to disaggregate whether it is profit motive or sound 
evidence-based policy behind the expansion of criminal justice surveillance 
technology.368 The advertising rhetoric (with services like PureTrack that are 
touted as “community-based” alternatives369) further compound the opacity 
problem. It is challenging to discern the precise service being offered or how it 
is used in practice.370 
In sum, the effectiveness of electronic surveillance can only be evaluated 
once there are better data and a greater understanding of the technology and its 
potential flaws.371 Collecting and analyzing data is well within the capacity of 
government agencies that oversee community supervision. For example, in 
2019, the Illinois General Assembly passed a bill that requires the state to collect 
and publish data on how electronic monitoring is used, including the 
demographics of who is placed on a monitor, the justifications for placing people 
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on monitors, and what happens to people once they are on monitors.372 This 
legislation has the potential to serve as a model for other states committed to 
better understanding how monitoring operates and if it leads to better 
outcomes. 
IV.  SUSPICION-BASED SURVEILLANCE: A PATH FORWARD 
By every indication, electronic surveillance is now a permanent fixture in 
the criminal legal system. The more challenging question is how to limit and 
regulate its imposition. In this final part, I suggest a path forward that not only 
takes seriously public safety and the rehabilitative goals of supervision but also 
moves away from the unfettered use of both consent and reasonableness to 
justify otherwise unconstitutionally invasive conditions. 
A. Require a Warrant 
The doctrinal solution for limiting electronic surveillance of those on 
community supervision is straightforward: require a warrant.373 There are two 
primary reasons this solution is doctrinally sound. First, electronic surveillance 
of people on community supervision, at least as currently employed, is 
conducted for law enforcement purposes and cannot be—nor should be—
construed as a “special needs” search. Unlike a physical search, where getting a 
warrant may be impractical, it is less clear that obtaining a warrant to search a 
cell phone or attach a GPS device to someone’s ankle is so impractical as to 
excuse the warrant requirement.374 
Furthermore, unlike the search at issue in Griffin, which was limited to a 
physical search by a probation officer to monitor compliance with probation, 
electronic surveillance is categorically different. The data obtained through 
electronic surveillance is routinely relied on by probation, parole, and police 
officers to make arrests for both new criminal offences and technical violations. 
For example, the International Association of Chiefs of Police extols GPS 
monitoring because it can help place an “offender at the scene of a crime, 
allowing an agency to identify potential suspects or witnesses” and “offender’s 
alibi maybe supported or discredited using GPS data.”375 According to the 
American Probation and Parole Association, “[m]any [probation and parole] 
agencies have implemented manual or automated crime scene correlation 
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systems that can identify tracked clients who were in the vicinity of a crime 
scene.”376 Similarly, some of the electronic monitoring contracts that people sign 
explain that police (not just probation and parole) officers may view and use the 
data as evidence against them,377 and GPS data is often relied on in criminal 
prosecutions.378 In these ways, electronic monitoring and surveillance of people 
on community supervision “is ultimately indistinguishable from the general 
interest in crime control.”379 
Unlike other special needs searches conducted by people who are clearly 
not law enforcement (such as teachers or employers), there is little distinction 
between probation officers and traditional police officers.380 On paper, parole 
and probation officers may have different missions as compared to traditional law 
enforcement officers, but in practice, their roles significantly overlap. Police 
officers routinely conduct probation and parole searches and through these 
searches discover evidence of new criminal offenses, technical violations, or 
both.381 At the same time, parole and probation officers monitor supervisees’ 
compliance with probation and parole conditions, but in many states they also 
have authority to arrest people for new criminal offenses as well as technical 
violations.382 In short, it is hard, if not impossible, to make the case that 
electronic surveillance is primarily imposed for non-law-enforcement purposes. 
Ironically, this conclusion is consistent with at least part of the Court’s 
reasoning in Knights and Samson: there was no dispute that the searches in those 
cases were not justified on special needs grounds. 
Second, if electronic surveillance is not categorized as a special needs 
search, then it should follow that it is presumptively unconstitutional unless 
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there is a warrant or an applicable exception.383 Requiring a warrant is not a 
particularly high bar. It requires only probable cause that the defendant either 
committed or is committing a new crime or violation of community supervision. 
This approach more likely ensures that electronic surveillance is imposed 
proportionally in a targeted and narrow way and not used as a bargaining 
chip. A warrant requirement also more closely guards against wrongful coercion 
and abuse and subjects the decision to appellate review.384 
Requiring a warrant for electronic surveillance is hardly uncharted 
territory. The Wiretap Act, for example, offers an instructive approach that 
“requires the government to meet very high standards.”385 Under that law, a 
court may issue an order authorizing electronic surveillance if it finds that: (1) 
there is probable cause to believe that the individual is committing, has 
committed, or will commit an enumerated offense; (2) that no other 
investigative procedures are feasible; and (3) that the surveillance is conducted 
in a way to minimize the interception of irrelevant information.386 This 
approach is appealing not only because of the probable cause requirement but 
also because of the demand for proportional surveillance. 
A warrant requirement also appropriately places those on probation and 
parole on similar footing as the arrested suspects in Riley and Carpenter. In 
particular, law enforcement may still search a probationer’s cell phone or rely on 
GPS monitoring, but they will need a warrant first. Given the availability of 
electronic communications with on-call trial judges, the warrant requirement 
does not pose an undue burden on law enforcement.387 As the Riley court 
explained, “Recent technological advances . . . have . . . made the process of 
obtaining a warrant itself more efficient.”388 Perhaps not surprisingly, since the 
Riley decision, there has been an uptick in warrants for cell phone searches—
suggesting that obtaining a warrant is hardly a difficult hurtle to overcome.389 
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in Samson, should be impermissible.”); see also Friedman & Stein, supra note 128, at 351 (referring to 
the Samson decision as “shameful”). 
 384. Of course, the probable cause standard is not immune from criticism, but entrepreneurial 
scholars, such as Andrew Crespo, have proposed creative ways of fortifying the probable cause standard 
with data. See Andrew Manuel Crespo, Probable Cause Pluralism, 129 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2020) 
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review). 
 385. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, supra note 245, at 1282; see also 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2511 (2018). 
 386. See § 2518(3). 
 387. See, e.g., Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 154 (2013) (“Well over a majority of States allow 
police officers or prosecutors to apply for search warrants remotely through various means, including 
telephonic or radio communication, electronic communication such as e-mail, and video 
conferencing.”). 
 388. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 401 (2014). 
 389. See Steve Roberts, Jr., Police Department Searches of Social Media, Cellphone Data Increasingly 
Common, VA. GAZETTE (July 5, 2019), https://www.vagazette.com/news/va-vg-search-warrants-
facebook-0617-story.html [https://perma.cc/R47T-JR9M (dark archive)]. 
98 N.C. L. REV. 717 (2020) 
2020] SUPERVISION BY SURVEILLANCE 773 
Not only is obtaining a warrant increasingly straightforward, there may be other 
relevant warrant exceptions that could provide a legal basis for a cell phone 
search, such as exigency. 
And even if expecting courts to require a warrant is unrealistic,390 at a 
minimum, courts should require some level of suspicion (either reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause) before subjecting someone to electronic 
surveillance. This approach accounts for the unique status of people on 
probation and parole and imposes minimal additional burdens on state actors. 
Additionally, it offers an important limitation on unfettered reliance on 
electronic surveillance. 
Critics may argue that requiring a warrant or some level of suspicion 
means that new crimes or probation violations will go undetected.391 That may 
be true. But, as the Riley court noted, “privacy comes at a cost.”392 The 
possibility of crimes going undetected is the price to not live in an Orwellian 
and totalitarian society. Simply because the technological capacity to detect 
lawbreakers with perfect omniscience and enforcement exists does not mean 
that we should deploy it.393 It is true that if electronic search conditions were 
limited, a probation officer would have a more difficult time detecting a 
supervisee’s use of a certain word or picture on Facebook. But perhaps that 
potential technical violation is itself more an artifact of the move toward 
automated probation rather than a true indication of dangerous or otherwise 
criminal activity. 
Additionally, requiring a higher threshold to conduct electronic 
surveillance does not alter the other traditional aspects of probation and parole. 
Even if there were a warrant requirement for electronic surveillance, people on 
community supervision would still be subject to physical searches, drug tests, 
meetings with probation officers, as well as all the other requirements that were 
in place—and relied on—before the advent of electronic surveillance 
technology. Whether these other requirements raise separate constitutional 
concerns is beyond the scope of this Article, but for now, those requirements 
provide additional avenues by which probation and parole officers may still 
monitor compliance. 
Critics might also ask if the Fourth Amendment is even necessary if 
electronic surveillance is imposed as a punishment. If surveillance is truly 
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imposed as part of a criminal sentence—just like imposing jail time—why must 
it pass Fourth Amendment muster? If other rights are diminished as part of a 
criminal sentence (like the right to vote, serve on a jury, or bear arms) why, then, 
can the government not limit privacy in the same way? The answer, at least 
in part, is that the Supreme Court has made it clear that the Bill of Rights limits 
what can be imposed in the name of “punishment.” Just as “prison[ers] are not 
beyond the reach of the Constitution”394 so too are those on community 
supervision.395 As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent in Samson, the Court has 
never imposed “any search as a punitive measure.”396 The justification for 
minimized privacy rights for those in prison, for example, is not punitive. In 
prison, the Court has found “[t]he curtailment of certain rights is necessary, as 
a practical matter, to accommodate a myriad of ‘institutional needs and 
objectives’ of prison facilities . . . chief among which is internal security.”397 
Indeed, there is “nothing talismanic about labeling a search a ‘punishment’ that 
automatically diminishes the privacy interests of the person being searched.”398 
B. Limit Surveillance 
Requiring a warrant, or at least some level of suspicion, is a necessary but 
insufficient solution to the problems inherent with electronic surveillance. The 
other half of the solution involves two shifts in criminal policy. First, a shift 
away from relying on community supervision as a default sentence; and second, 
a shift away from relying on intensive surveillance as a necessary component of 
community supervision. 
Simply because probation and parole exist as nonincarcerative sentences, 
this does not mean that they should be frequently imposed. In fact, less is often 
the best strategy. As other scholars have observed, community supervision 
results in net widening and is often imposed in cases when less intensive (or no) 
supervision could serve as an alternative.399 Moreover, despite the growing 
popularity of alternatives to incarceration, there is little empirical evidence that 
intensive community supervision furthers rehabilitation, reentry, or protects 
public safety.400 
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Given the critiques of community supervision, it should not be utilized as 
a presumptive sentence that is imposed instead of condition-free release.401 This 
view is shared by a growing number of current and former probation chiefs who 
recently released a joint statement calling for the reduction of probation and 
parole populations.402 In a related policy report, several leading probation experts 
called for reform focused on less intensive supervision and instead on reserving 
community supervision for those that truly need it.403 This same report also 
examined extensive data to disprove the notions that “more people have to be 
under criminal justice control for crime to decline” and for “prison populations 
to decrease.”404  
Eliminating community supervision as a default sentence does not mean 
that low-level defendants will receive no sanction. Even without probation and 
parole, there remain responses to criminal conduct that further the deterrent, 
rehabilitative, and retributive theories of punishment. The process of facing 
criminal charges is in itself punitive.405 Pretrial detention, bail, administrative 
fees, restitution, and fine payments, as well as the burdens of attending multiple 
court dates, all add up to an ultimate de facto sanction. In many low-level or 
first-time offenses, a conviction is punishment enough, given the extensive 
collateral consequences of a criminal record. Even if not placed on probation or 
parole, defendants continue to be punished when their criminal record becomes 
a barrier to education, employment, and housing.406 In short, unconditional 
release should be considered more often.407 
For the reasons detailed in this Article, the use of electronic surveillance 
as a tool of community supervision should be limited and proportional. While 
there may be a place for electronic surveillance in community supervision, it 
must be narrowly tailored to the specific needs of the individual and impose as 
little of a privacy burden as possible. Imposing surveillance in this limited way, 
however, requires greater understanding of how surveillance technology 
operates, and in particular, how it may be more precisely targeted to avoid overly 
invasive monitoring. It also requires “[s]trict oversight of private vendors” so as 
to ensure that electronic surveillance “does not become a tool for financial 
 
 401. See Horwitz, The Costs of Abusing, supra note 79, at 771 (“[A]s many as 80% of adult 
misdemeanor convictions result in sentences of probation.”). 
 402. JERRY ADGER, ET AL., JOINT STATEMENT ON THE FUTURE OF COMMUNITY 
CORRECTIONS 1 (Aug. 28, 2017), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/wiener/
programs/pcj/files/statement_on_the_future_of_community_corrections_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/
ZF73-799R]. 
 403. JACOBSON ET AL., supra note 312, at 11; Scott-Hayward, supra note 86, at 460–61. 
 404. JACOBSON ET AL., supra note 312, at 7. 
 405. MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A 
LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 199 (1992). 
 406. See generally LOVE ET AL., supra note 287, at §	1:2 (describing the range of legal collateral 
consequences). 
 407. See Klingele, supra note 317, at 1057. 
98 N.C. L. REV. 717 (2020) 
776 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98 
enrichment of the private sector at the expense of both government and low-
income individuals.”408 
There is also much to be learned from community organizers who have 
long been fighting back against the expansion of electronic surveillance in the 
criminal legal system. These grassroots organizations have proposed common-
sense guidelines for respecting the rights of people on electronic monitors. 
These guidelines include increasing transparency, not using a one-size-fits-all 
set of rules, eliminating fees, increasing privacy protections, and ensuring due 
process.409 Perhaps most significantly, the guidelines also call for electronic 
monitoring to be the option of last resort.410 Although these guidelines focus on 
electronic monitoring, they could apply with equal force to any form of 
electronic surveillance. 
As this Article sets out, electronic searches and surveillance may have 
reached a point in which the government “can replicate the surveillance 
conditions of incarceration without ever erecting a single wall.”411 Therefore, 
electronic surveillance should be viewed for what it is both as a matter of law and 
as a matter of practice: punishment.412 To categorize electronic searches and 
surveillance as a form of punishment is not only more accurate, but also signals 
the need for closer judicial scrutiny, oversight, and restraint.413 
CONCLUSION 
Given the millions of people on some form of community supervision, the 
increased capacity of surveillance technology represents “a revolution of historic 
proportions.”414 It is therefore imperative that invasive, and potentially abusive, 
forms of electronic surveillance be subject to constitutional scrutiny, policy 
analysis, and public debate. 
The significance of searches “untethered” from any meaningful 
constitutional limitation extends beyond electronic surveillance. The 
emergence of suspicionless electronic searches represents a cautionary tale about 
the consequences of deploying “consent” and “reasonableness” to justify abusive 
practices that would otherwise be unconstitutional, unconscionable, or both. 
One could imagine a not-so-distant future when, as a matter of routine, 
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criminal defendants could be asked to “consent” to forced sterilization,415 
lifetime GPS monitoring,416 forced participation in medical experiments,417 or 
other draconian measures. Further, the general “reasonableness” test has already 
been deployed by several lower courts to justify compulsory DNA profiling of 
people on probation and parole.418 As Judge Reinhardt noted in his dissent in 
one of the forced-DNA collection cases, “Privacy erodes first at the margins, 
but once eliminated, its protections are lost for good, and the resultant damage 
is rarely, if ever, undone.”419 While this Article focused on the abusive elements 
of electronic surveillance, these concerns about abusive tactics are not limited to 
electronic searches. More than ever, a new systematic and transparent approach 
for determining which rights can be diminished, and for whom, is needed. 
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